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Freedom from fear

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Pirates of the XXI Century on the treasure hunt

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**A Business
Worth 50
Million Dollars**
Marco Fornari



**Restorative
Justice**
Lisa Rea and
Theo Gavrielidis



**Freedom of
Speech**
Journalists Under Attack
Interview
with O.F. Osman

In this edition with Freedom From Fear



The Documentary

For a future with a human face

The documentary "For a future with a human face" was produced during the 2008 edition of Terra Madre - the international meeting of food communities attended by over 1,652 communities from 153 countries.

UNICRI supported the event with the aim of reducing people's vulnerability to crime by enhancing local cultures and productions, and the principles of social justice and development. UNICRI has also raised awareness about the need to support local development and micro-credit in order to enhance the rule of law.

This 15 minutes movie, focuses on the UN Millennium Development Goals, and aims to promote a global debate on the priority issues of the international community, starting from people's voices and experiences.



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Terra
madre



Troubled Waters

Somalia is a key country in the Horn of Africa. The Somali waters have been experiencing a dramatic rise in the number of pirate attacks to cargo ships and vessel, and this offshore threat to international trade is accompanied by unstable conditions inland.

There is a critical need to tackle the problem of piracy with a multifaceted approach to ensure that the political process, the peacekeeping efforts and the strengthening of institutions work in tandem. The legacies resulting from the dictatorship and from more than 10 years of civil wars are hindering a prompt reconstruction of the country.

The younger generations in Somalia do not even know the meaning of a peaceful society, and the population at large is suffering from a lack of institutions, underdevelopment, and some freedom restrictions. Moreover, the hijacking of vessels and ships is a fruitful business, but it is first and foremost a crime.

According to official sources, the overall amount of ransoms demanded by pirate groups over the past few years has risen from tens of thousands of US dollars to hundreds of thousands. Since 2007, both the size and the number of ransoms paid have increased tremendously; it is estimated that in 2008 the average ransom was between half a million to two million US dollars, while the revenue from piracy was between 18-30 million US dollars.

Humanitarian aid and trade are at stake. Every year, some 16.000 ships pass through the Gulf of Aden; these represent about the 10% of the maritime trade worldwide. The numbers are impressive, but the potential domino effect for other areas is even more so.

We believe that Somalia's waters are a compelling case for innovative policy making for the security of people and international trade.

Sandro Calvani
UNICRI Director

Hans-Joerg Albrecht
Max Planck institute

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
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The Responsibility to Protect: Whom from What?

* Edward C. Luck



Undoubtedly the responsibility to protect is a hot item. Endorsed and explained in two detailed paragraphs (138 and 139) of the unanimously adopted Outcome Document of the 2005 World Summit, it has since been reaffirmed by the General Assembly (resolution 60/1) and the Security Council (resolutions 1674 (2006) and 1706 (2006)), and the subject of a major speech (SG/SM/11701) and a major report (A/63/677) of UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon. The General Assembly is expected to take up the Secretary-General's report, which lays out a comprehensive strategy

for implementing the concept, in what promises to be a lively debate at some point in the next two months. Civil society networks for researching and advocating the responsibility to protect have sprung up in many parts of the world, as have any number of books, articles, and commentaries on the subject. It has acquired, as well, the ultimate symbols of trendiness: an acronym (or two really, RtoP for the UN and R2P for most everyone else) and a devoted academic journal, *Global Responsibility to Protect*. Not bad for a term first coined by Gareth Evans and the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) less than eight years ago.

Notoriety, however, guarantees neither universal popularity nor conceptual clarity. The dual notion – that states have an inherent, sovereign responsibility to protect their populations from harm and that the international community has a parallel responsibility to help – clearly has wide appeal. The very breadth of this appeal, however, has opened the concept to widely divergent interpretations. The deceptively simple query, who should protect whom from what?, has elicited a variety of responses.

By and large, civil society activists have embraced RtoP in its most ambitious guise: as encompassing the whole range of security and welfare goals envisioned by a shift of policy orientation from state to human security. People, it is said, should be protected from the ravages of climate change, HIV/AIDS, and natural disasters, among other plagues. The 2001 ICISS report spoke of “situations of compelling human need” and of the consequences of “state failure,” painting a canvas of historic proportions, but leaving the hard policy choices and distinctions to others.

Governments of all stripes, not surprisingly, have been far more circumspect, inclined to paint within the numbers, as they chart much stricter boundaries within the bold ICISS panorama. The surface consensus in 2005 was possible, it seems, in part because the answer to the “from what?” question was restricted to four kinds of atrocity crimes and violations already well-embedded in international law, namely genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. In 2005, the assembled heads of state and government unambiguously pledged to prevent those four crimes and violations, as well as their incitement. This was, and remains, a historic commitment. Identifying and implementing ways to discourage such atrocity crimes would be a singular accomplishment with wide human rights, humanitarian, political, and security implications. To try to extend the concept to cover other calamities,

cautioned the Secretary-General in his 2009 report, “would undermine the 2005 consensus and stretch the concept beyond recognition or operational utility.” That the UN has long been prone to do just that, turning one simple and straightforward concept after another into hopelessly holistic mush, should be ample warning to resist such attempts this time around.

At the same time, the Secretary-General has underscored the need for an approach that is as deep in terms of the range of tools that should be brought to the task as it is narrow in the scope of ills to be targeted. His report outlines three pillars – state responsibility, international assistance, and, if necessary, international response – that would support a system-wide effort by the United Nations system, as well as by regional and sub-regional bodies, civil society partners, and most importantly, sovereign states themselves. Prevention is stressed, along with early warning and assessment. The 2005 Summit called for “timely and decisive” response should national authorities be “manifestly failing” to meet their protection responsibilities regarding the four specified crimes and violations. That response, the Secretary-General underscores, should draw on the whole spectrum of Chapter VI, VII, and VIII measures, as appropriate in each case, and be undertaken within the framework of the UN Charter. To the understandable concern that major powers would abuse RtoP by citing it as a pretext for intervention undertaken for ulterior reasons, the Secretary-General has pointed out that the best way to discourage such misapplications of the term is to fully develop the kind of well-defined, narrowly focused, and Charter-based conception and strategy that he has advocated.

The question of whom should be protected can be answered simply: everyone. States are to protect their “populations,” not just their citizens, according to the Summit Outcome Document. Presumably this should cover populations in occupied territories, as well as those in areas controlled by or threatened by armed groups. States are not always the ones committing the atrocities. In Sierra Leone, for instance, it was the RUF, not the government, that adopted the policy of severing the limbs of innocent civilians. And it required international armed intervention to help that government regain sovereign control over its territory.

The strength of RtoP lies in its political currency, in its capacity to move and inspire people, and, over time, even governments and international organizations. It will require discipline and vigilance to ensure that asset does not become a liability. It is in the coming months, during RtoP’s infancy, that its future character will be defined. With care, we can ensure that this UN-brokered principle, at least, is off to a good start toward realizing its full potential in the years ahead.

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ISTITUTO ITALIANO
PER L'AFRICA E L'ORIENTE



A bleak year for piracy

From Somalia to Nigeria unprecedented rise in maritime hijackings

* Pottengal Mukundan

2008 has been a bleak year for piracy. The figures of the annual report by the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) Piracy Reporting Centre (PRC) surpass all figures for hijacked vessels and hostages taken recorded since it began its worldwide reporting function in 1992.

In 2008 there was a total of 293 incidents of piracy against ships worldwide, showing an increase of more than 11% from 2007 when 263 incidents were reported. In 2008, 49 vessels were hijacked, 889 crewmembers were taken hostage and a further 46 vessels reported being fired upon. A total, of 32 crewmembers were injured, 11 were killed, 21 went missing and are presumed dead. Guns were used in 139 incidents (in 2007 they were just 72).

The increase is attributed to the number of attacks in the Gulf of Aden, with 111 incidents reported on the east coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. The rise peaked in September, when 19 attacks were reported. In October and November, respectively 15 and 16 vessels were attacked.

This represents an increase of nearly 200% from 2007. In addition, in 2008 Somali pirates hijacked their largest tanker ever, and successful attacks were carried out at greater distances from land than in previous years. All types of vessels with varying freeboards and speeds were targeted; neverthe-

less, it is the slow vessels with low freeboards that are particularly vulnerable. The pirates boarding the vessels were also better armed than in previous years and more prepared to assault and injure the crew.

Incidents involving guns nearly doubled from 72 in 2007 to 139 last year. However, there are encouraging signs in recent efforts to tackle Somali piracy. In October and November 2008 the ratio of hijacked vessels to number of attacks was one in three. In December 2008, after UNSCR 1851 was passed, the EUNAVFOR's MSCHOA was set up, the group transits began operating, and this ratio decreased to one in five. Since the beginning of 2009, the ratio is one in eight. What this means is that the attacks against vessels are continuing, but the successful hijackings have diminished. This is attributable to the efforts of the Masters of vessels manoeuvring more aggressively than previously to prevent allowing pirate craft to draw up alongside. The most important reason, however, is the effort of

The main difference between the East and West African pirate activities is that almost all the incidents in Nigeria are conducted within its territorial waters

Somalia at a Glance

Somalia became independent in the 1960s, when the two protectorates, Great Britain's in the South and Italy's in the North, were unified. A military coup headed by Mohamed Siad Barre in 1969, brought the country into a military regime that very soon shifted into an authoritarian rule which somehow managed to generate a certain degree of balance. After having experienced such 'stability', the country precipitated into a civil chaos in 1991 after Siad Barre was overthrown by opposing clans. Since then Somalia, whose territory occupies a strategic and crucial position in the Horn of Africa has been living in full anarchy. Shortly after Barre's capitulation, the northern region of Somalia self-declared the independent Republic of Somaliland, a country never recognized by other states, which, however, has been preserving a stable existence: the Republic includes today eight administrative districts and it keeps its effort to guarantee democratic representation, holding elections at all levels, local and parliamentary.

A few years later, in 1998, the regions of Bari, Nugaal, and northern Mudug had come together to form the autonomous state of Puntland, which is not seeking independence, but whose functioning has been autonomous and self-sufficient so far.

After a tentative reconciliation, which failed in 2000, a protracted talk held in Kenya gave birth to the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (TFG) and the formation of the Somalia Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs). While the TFIs immediately encountered several problems, the TFG remained the real point of reference for external donors and international interlocutors.

In 2006 a coalition of clerics, known as the Council of Islamic Courts (CIC), took control of the capital Mogadishu and of the south of the country after having kicked out the warlords who had previously ruled the capital for 15 years.

With the backing of the Ethiopian troops, the forces of the TFG managed to take back the control over the Islamists, but by late 2008, the Islamic insurgents (including the Al Shaabab group) regained most of the southern area of the country. The symbolic city of Baidoa, formerly a monopoly of the TFG, was taken over by the opponent clans as well.

The recent election of the TFG's interim president, the moderate Islamic, Sheik Sharif Ahmed, is seen by most as an unprecedented chance to normalize the country.

The new president was the head of the Islamic Courts Union when they gained control of Mogadishu in 2006; he was forced into exile by the Ethiopian troops and called back into Somali soil by the former president, Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed.

Mr. Ahmed's task is huge: he won the election with the slogan "to crash or co-opt the jihadists" (which had taken over large portions of the country) and he pledged to rebuild national unity.

The new government has very little budget and is entirely supported by donors; the composition of the cabinet is extremely wide, and it operates from in the neighbouring Djibouti.

Moreover, the jihadists are rising in number and they control the important port cities of Kismayo and Marko, and part of Mogadishu. According to intelligence sources, they are also ready to deploy suicide bombers in order to spread fear and to stop the re-installment of an elected government.

Source: BBC News, CIA, Economist Intelligent Unit.



Figures

Population:	9 million (UN, 2008)
Capital:	Mogadishu
Area:	637,657sq km (246,201 sq miles)
Major languages:	Somali, Arabic, Italian, English
Major religion:	Islam
Life expectancy:	47 years (men), 49 years (women)
Monetary unit:	1 Somali shilling = 100 cents
Main exports:	Livestock, bananas, hides, fish
GNI per capita:	n/a
Administrative division:	18 region; Awdal, Bakool, Banaadir, Bari, Bay, Galkuud, Gedo, Hirshabelle, Jubbada Hoose, Jubbada Uoose, Mudug, Nugaal, Sanaag, Shabeellaha Dhexe, Shabeellaha Uoose, Sool, Togdheer, Woqooyi Galbeed

Economic overview: Despite the lack of effective national governance, Somalia has maintained a healthy informal economy, largely based on livestock, remittance/money transfer companies, and telecommunications. Agriculture is the most important sector, with livestock normally accounting for about 40% of GDP and about 65% of export earnings.

the navies to robustly act against the pirates and their mother vessels. Forty-nine pirates have been seized and handed over to Kenya and Yemen for prosecution by naval vessels. International navies are the only ones capable of effective response against piracy and can help to ensure the safety and security of this major maritime trade route. It is vital that the governments with naval units in the area look upon this commitment as a long-term one, until the coastal states of the region are able to respond meaningfully. The worst possible outcome would be if the naval units were withdrawn prematurely. If that happened, Somali pirates would be back in business within weeks.

In 2008, Nigeria ranked second with 40 documented incidents including 27 vessels boarded, five hijacked and 39 crewmembers kidnapped. The IMB is also aware of approximately 100 further unconfirmed incidents that have occurred in Nigeria. Under-reporting from vessels involved in incidents in the Nigerian waters remains a great concern.

The main difference between the East and West African pirate activities is that almost all the incidents in Nigeria are conducted within its territorial waters, whereas most of the incidents along the East coast of Africa and the Gulf of Aden occur out in high seas.

On the positive side, there have been declines in other regions.

Incidents involving guns nearly doubled from 72 in 2007 to 139 last year

Indonesia should be applauded for its sustained efforts in curbing piracy and armed robbery in its waters. Compared to 2003, when 121 attacks were reported, there has been a continued year-on-year decline with 28 incidents reported in 2008, the majority of which were opportunistic, low-level attacks.

The Malacca Strait has also seen a reduction in the number of incidents reported, only two in 2008 compared to seven in 2007.

Farther south, the Singapore Strait saw a slight rise in incidents, going rising from three to six.

This welcomed reduction has been the result of increased vigilance and patrolling by the littoral states, particularly Malaysia and Indonesia, and the continued precautionary measures on board ships.

Bangladesh (Chittagong) and Tanzania (Dar es Salaam) have had similar low-level attacks aimed at vessels at anchor and those approaching the anchorage. Robbers in Chittagong mainly steal ship stores while in Dar es Salaam the cargo on container ships is the target. Of the 14 vessels attacked in Dar es Salaam, 12 were container ships. Bangladesh has shown a slight increase in the number of attacks (12) compared to last year (10).

It has taken the Bangladeshi authorities a considerable effort to bring the number of incidents down and this pressure on the robbers should be sustained.

The IMB strongly urges all shipmasters and owners to report



all incidents of actual and attempted piracy and armed robbery to our Piracy Reporting Centre. This is the first step in the response chain and it is vital in ensuring that adequate resources are allocated by governments to deal with the problem. A set of transparent statistics from an independent, non-political, international organization such as the IMB PRC acts as an effective catalyst to achieve this goal.

In an effort to counter Piracy in the Gulf of Aden and off the east coast of Somalia, industry bodies including the IMB have published the Best Management Practice (BMP) guidelines. The recommendations included in these guidelines can prevent attacks. It is envisaged that this will be a live document amended as new information regarding the modus operandi of attacks comes to light.

Early detection of pirate crafts will give vessels a better chance to evade the attacks. It will also help naval vessels to respond meaningfully to these attempted attacks and gain vital intelligence regarding the location of pirate mother ships. Action against mother ships is the tactical response. It helps prevent future attacks and imposes a cost and risk upon the pirate gangs engaging in this activity.

With the world economy in its present uncertain condition, there is a possibility of piracy increasing in some areas. Additional costs incurred by ships deviating to avoid piracy is a further burden upon consumers. The attacks against ships must be brought under control; governments and industries have a key role to play in this respect.

* Captain Pottengal Mukundan is Director of the International Maritime Bureau.

The IMB is part of the ICC Commercial Crime Services, which is a specialised division of the International Chamber of Commerce, the world business organisation.

UPHEAVAL IN THE HORN



An aerial photograph of the oil tanker Vela sailing on the open ocean. The ship's deck is green, and the hull is dark blue with a red stripe. The name 'Vela' is written in white on the side. The superstructure is white with a 'NO SMOKING' sign. The ship is viewed from an elevated angle, showing its complex deck layout and various structures.

OF AFRICA

**A BUSINESS
WORTH 50
MILLION DOLLARS**

**80 ships were seized in 2008,
hundreds of hostages taken in the pirate attacks**

*** Francesco Fornari**

Nur is a common name, but it is just as likely that it is not his real name; he has been living for some time on the coast of Kenya near Lamu, one of the last standing examples of Islamic architecture, not far from the Somali border. He is a little over forty years old, he speaks broken English and is constantly chewing on “khat,” leaves from a plant that grows in some areas of Kenya and Ethiopia which cause a mild state of euphoria and are commonly used in Somalia. Although he was initially diffident and almost scared of my questions, he overcame his hesitation in front of a few banknotes and accepted my invitation to tell his story and his experience as a pirate.

He was born and grew up in a little fishing village on the coast of Somalia, not far from Bosaso. He started going off to sea when he was 12 years old, just like his father and his brothers had done. “The sea was full of fish, we would get back to shore with the boat overflowing with tuna, sharks, lobsters and large prawns. Then came the foreign fishing boats; they would fish illegally and they

This profitable activity soon caught the eye of big criminal organizations: the “warlords”

didn’t hesitate to ram our ships if we got too close. We couldn’t fish anything anymore, so we organized ourselves to confront this threat since the government wasn’t doing anything to protect us. Now they call us pirates, but we were just protecting our sea.” It was 1998. Nur and his comrades had seized their first fishing boat. “It was easy and we made a lot of money. They paid a hefty ransom and we decided that it was an easy way to make money.” From fishing boats to cargo ships passing through the Gulf of Aden, “these were a more lucrative prey because the ship owners are more willing to pay to get their ships and cargo back without too much discussion.” But this profitable activity soon caught the eye of big criminal organizations: the “warlords” intervened as leaders of the most important local clans of rebels with small

private armies at their disposal. They enlisted the fishermen through persuasion and intimidation. “You either work for them or they kill you,” says Nur, “but I refused to because I didn’t like the idea of risking my life for so little

“You either work for them or they kill you”

money while working for an organization that’s getting richer and richer. My friends and I tried continue on our own anyway but it was dangerous. Not at sea, where we are the masters, but when we were on dry land we constantly ran the risk of being killed: they burnt our houses down, they threatened us and I realized that my life was at stake, so I ran away.”

He doesn’t seem to want to stop talking now. As he chews fervently on “khat,” drinks Coca Cola and smokes cigarettes, he tells us all about his deeds, about seizing ships. He excitedly flaunts his courage but his stories now seem invented rather than actual events.

Eyl, the new Tortuga

The pirates of the Horn of Africa have set their main base in Eyl, a town in Puntland, the region from which the former Somali President, Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed.

I had visited that region back in 1995: the seashore north of Mogadishu was full of beached cisterns, rusting and leaking a foul-smelling viscous liquid; the local residents talked about dead animals and sick people, about ships dumping barrels into the sea, like the ones that come aground along the shore. The fishermen would often have to cut their nets because they would get tangled in the barrels lying on the bottom of the sea. The United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) has often denounced this trafficking in hazardous waste coming from Europe, warning about the impending ecological disaster.

This is a shady business; it is a story involving foreign multinational corporations, mafias, corrupt politicians, secret services. In 1994 the journalist Ilaria Alpi, who was conducting an investigation for the Italian news programme TG3, was killed along with her cameraman Miran Hrovatin in Mogadishu because she might have discov-

ered something highly compromising.

I arrived in Eyl after a long and rather dangerous trip, constantly running the risk of being attacked by groups of armed gangs who control the territory and are always fighting among each other. Eyl used to be one of the many little fishing seaports, with mud huts, dirt roads and just a few hundred inhabitants.

The fishermen tried to survive as best as they could. To make ends meet they would sell their fish in the local market; women coming from the hinterland would come once a week to buy fish. The earnings were impossibly low because most of fish would go bad after a few days since there were no refrigerated storage spaces. Moreover, the largest market, the one in Mogadishu, is 600 kilometres away, there were no ice trucks to transport the fish and nobody wanted to embark on such a hopeless journey. The streets are “unsafe” because morian” (bandits) run amok in their off-road vehicles with machine guns and grenade launchers mounted on the back, blocking every vehicle on their turf.

Now there are more than two thousand people in Eyl. Sumptuous mansions have been built for the traffickers; there are fuel deposits for the pirates’ motorboats; there are inns and restaurants where the hostages who are kidnapped during the assaults are fed and given hospitality (at their own expense), while the seized boats are moored in the harbour or in other coves along the coastline.

The story of the Sirius Star

The Sirius Star is a large Saudi oil tanker that was anchored 450 miles off the coast of Eyl. It was transporting 2 million barrels of crude oil when it was seized on November 15th; it was the biggest exploit in Somali piracy after the highjacking of the Ukrainian ship Faina carrying 33 tanks and other equipment used in warfare. This cargo was originally destined for the Kenyan army,

“I didn’t like the idea of risking my life for so little money while working for an organization that’s getting richer and richer”



although the government of Nairobi has firmly denied it; other sources report it was meant for Sudan.

This ship, along with its dangerous cargo, is anchored near Hobyo, and is making engineering, and it would be a real tragedy if it ended up in the hands of the Islamic insurgents. It seems as though there were some differences of opinion among the pirates who hijacked the ship: some of them wanted to unload the weapons and the tanks in order to sell them to the highest bidder (it was said that the Eritrean government had expressed interest in the purchase), while others just wanted the ransom money.

According to sailors onboard an American battleship stationed near Faina, there was a gunfight between rival groups in which three pirates died, and unconfirmed sources report that another crew member succumbed to illness.

Eighty ships have been seized by Somali pirates since the beginning of the year. According to more conservative estimates, the turnover amounts to 50 million dollars but this figure is destined to increase if, as speculated, a 25 million dollar ransom was demanded for the Sirius Star alone (other sources report that the ransom request decreased to 10 million dollars).

The negotiations took place in Eyl, the pirates' headquarters, a modern-day Tortuga, the historical Haitian base of the Welsh pirate Henry Morgan who terrorized the waters off the Antilles by attacking dozens and dozens of Spanish and Portuguese ships be-

tween 1660 and 1670.

From the princely mansions that are highly protected by armed militiamen, orders are sent out to the mother ships lying off the coast with their flotillas of speedboats, which quickly carry these modern-day buccaneers to their targets. With a few rounds of machinegun fire or a few grenades they force the crew to stop their ship. The pirates swiftly board the ship with grappling hooks and rope ladders and force the captain to set sail toward their ports.

The pirates communicate the successful boarding by radio and the organization immediately contacts the shipping company, which has usually already been contacted by radio by the captain of the ship under attack.

“Hawala,” the informal money transfer network popular among migrants

A few hours later, in the dusty streets of Eyl, modern off-road vehicles arrive carrying mediators and negotiators. Most of the time the negotiations are quick and the ransom is paid in cash. At first it seemed as though the system of choice was the “hawala”, an informal money transfer network popular among migrants. But now the pirates want hard cash to be delivered at the moment of the handover.

After the attack on the super oil tanker, it was thought that the pirates were

making use of infiltrators who were informing them about the departure of ships with important cargos and the course they were following.

In order to avoid the Gulf of Aden, the Sirius Star had chosen to navigate the Cape of Good Hope, even though circumnavigating Africa (following the course discovered in 1498 by Vasco de Gama) would extend the journey by two to three weeks, with an increase in cost of roughly 500 thousand dollars. Nevertheless, the pirates were waiting for them, far from their usual course. Thus, someone must have informed the pirates of the last-minute decision taken by the ship owner.

There are over fifteen gangs operating in these waters; all of them are equipped with very fast speedboats, machineguns, grenade launchers and sophisticated radar and GPS technology.

The most bloodthirsty of them are based in Eyl, like the Somali Youth Coastguard and the Somali Marines. Facilitated by the lack of lawenforcement structures, these groups attacked ships that were dumping toxic waste into the ocean. Their goal was not to prevent the hazardous waste from being thrown overboard and polluting the ecosystem, but to demand a kickback. This earned them much money and, thus, the local “rais” took over: they hired the fishermen in order to exploit their skill and knowledge of the sea, they put their armed militia onboard and they became true pirates attacking ships in transit.

The most dangerous waters in the world

Today, the waters off the coast of Somalia are the most dangerous in the world.

Following a request by the UN, there are now roughly thirty warships belonging to

It was thought that the pirates were making use of infiltrators who were informing them about the departure of ships with important cargos and the course they were following





There are huge profits and virtually no risks involved because the crews of the cargo ships put up no resistance; they try to avoid being captured but it is difficult for these huge container ships and oil tankers to outrun speedboats

various nations cruising the area; their presence has foiled a considerable number of attacks, but over the past nine months the International Maritime Bureau's Piracy Reporting Centre has registered 107 attacks, 27 of which failed.

Pirates feel relatively safe, partly because rules of engagement limit the actions of warships patrolling the Gulf of Aden and they can only intervene if there is an act of piracy underway. Italian ships succeeded only once, in April, when the destroyer Etna responded to an alarm launched by a cargo ship under attack nearby and foiled the boarding attempt by deploying a helicopter which forced the pirates to desist.

A few months ago, there was a gunfight involving the Indian frigate Tabar, which sank one of the pirate mother ships because the crew refused to let their ship be inspected. According to the captain of the Tabar, the assailants had missiles and grenade launchers in place and were preparing to attack the Indian frigate, which responded.

In Somalia and in the Horn of Africa, piracy is a means of survival. It is born of necessity; these modern pirates were formerly fishermen but in 1991, when the civil war that is still ravaging Somalia broke out, they could no longer do their job; this was because of the illegal competition of non-Somali fishing fleets which, undisputed and unpunished, are depleting the fish population of Africa.

Satellite pictures show approximately 700 foreign boats fishing illegally. As mentioned above, the first attacks were carried out by Somali fishermen against this competition. When they found they could act undisturbed, they began targeting ships transiting through the Gulf of Aden and have now ex-

tended their range of action to hundreds of miles off the coast of Somalia.

There are huge profits and virtually no risks involved because the crews of the cargo ships put up no resistance; they try to avoid being captured but it is difficult for these huge container ships and oil tankers to outrun speedboats.

Sensing a good deal, the warlords have intervened; traffickers living in Dubai or Yemen and fishermen are hired by gangs of pirates and the number of attacks has increased.

Foreign warships patrolling the area are creating some difficulties but the business is too lucrative and the traffickers stop in front of nothing.

From their mansions, they monitor the operations, they locate the most interesting targets, they conduct ransom negotiations, pocketing millions of dollars, and they do not risk a thing. The ones paying the consequences are the pirates themselves, as they skim over the water with their speedboats, risking their lives for a few thousand dollars: a real fortune in a country as poor as Somalia. It is a dramatic choice for them: either dying from deprivation on dry land, risking their lives on the stormy seas or being killed by the cannonballs of warships.

(Translated by Olivia Jung)

* **Francesco Fornari** is a freelance journalist, and he has been reporting extensively from Africa for 34 years.

Source: *Finis Terræ* Magazine, Italy



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Somalia

Media under attack



INTERVIEW with Omar Faruk

by * Nicola Filizola

Freedom of information in Somalia is at risk: gripped by anarchic violence and chaos, this nation of the Horn of Africa, has been ranked among the deadliest country for media by the Committee to Protect Journalists.

Said Tahlil Ahmed, director of the independent HornAfrica, one of the leading radio and television station, was brutally killed with a shot to the head in Mogadishu last 4 February. He was heading to a meeting with members of the militia Al Shaabab, and his name is already the second in the sad list of journalists who have been murdered in 2009.

The reporter is only the last victim of a long series of assassinations, harassments, attacks and kidnappings that have been occurring in the country for the last years. This condition of fear frequently undermines the capacity to provide information, since many journalists choose to work in secret and, sometimes, to give up their jobs altogether.

Such a scenario has been worsening since the beginning of 2006, and the figures made public by the National Union of Somali Journalists (NUSOJ) in its annual reports for 2007 and 2008 entitled "Somalia: A precarious and perilous place for the press"¹, are impressive.

We have interviewed Omar Faruk, Secretary General of the National Union of Somali Journalists (NUSOJ), to discuss the current condition of the freedom of the information in Somalia and to understand the need of pirates to gain the attention of the media.

Q: Mr. Osman, in the last three years many journalists and media professionals have been at risk, and some of them died. What are the main figures of this discrimination according to the NUSOJ report?

A: 2007 was the *annus horribilis* for media workers in Somalia: 9 media professionals were killed; 4 were wounded; 53 were arrested; and some 60 journalists fled the country to escape the tragedy of this persecution. The violations of press freedom have increased by 85% from 2006 to 2007. Last year, two journalists were killed (one of them was blown up with a remote controlled bomb), and two more were arrested; however, despite the numbers have diminished, general work conditions were still deprived of the fundamental human rights and labour rights.

Q: As a journalist, what is the most dangerous area in the country to operate in?

A: The worst area to operate as media personnel is the Somaliland, in the south of the country. The two victims of 2009 were murdered in Kismayo, in south Somalia, a city that is particularly affected by intimidations to journalists. One of the two was the then vice president of the Journalist trade



union, NUSOJ, Nasteh Dahir, who worked for both the BBC and Associated Press news agency; he was very active in denouncing the intimidations and was shot in the chest and stomach just outside his home.

Q: Besides the discrimination and the harassment, what are other consequences of such a condition?

A: The sense of fear in which the media lives has provoked another trend. As a result of this campaign of intimidation, several incidents happening to media workers go unreported. Journalists have become a *persona non grata* and for most of them the only possible solution is fleeing away from the country.

Q: What can be openly told and, diversely, what are the sensitive matters?

A: Publishing or broadcasting any news that matters is a problem. Political news, or any news critical to belligerent factions in Somalia, may cost the journalist's life or lead to shutting down the media house. The relationship between the officials of the transitional federal government and the journalists seem to be improving since the expansion of the parliament and the election of President Sheik Sharif Sheik Ahmed. The previous leadership in the government had terrible relationships with news media.

Q: How far could a wider coverage help and support the national building process? And by whom do you feel bolstered as a category?

A: As you know, Somalis have been killing each other for the last 20 years. The country seems divided into blocks by warlords or regional administrations. Some people have taken to each other extreme hostilities. The media is the main channel that can help facilitate dialogue and boost the national reconciliation process, which is the only chance to achieve lasting peace and to rebuild the nation. Somali journalists get support from the ordinary people who feel that they are providing news and information in a dangerous situation. We also get political, moral and financial support from the international community of international press freedom advocacy groups, human rights organisations and donor agencies.

Q: What kind of support do you miss most?

A: As you can see the whole system of the country is fragmented. The three key institutions of any country, the Executive, Legislative and Judiciary branches, are either too weak or non-existent. The media needs protection from the national government, and this is what we are missing.

Q: Is piracy an issue covered and discussed by the media in Somalia? Do the pirates want to avoid such an exposition?

A: It is the opposite. The pirates themselves contact the media, while the media sometimes looks for the pirates. The pirates want media attention and they want to get it through the local media. If the media does not report things, as they want, then the media faces problems of pirates who could endanger the journalists' lives.

Q: How do society sees piracy as a phenomenon? And how is it seen by those who are involved in it?

A: Most of the public sees this problem of insecurity in Somalia's waters and in international seas as one that they have been enduring for the last 18 years. There have been kidnappings for ransom and there have been robberies, but people believe that they have finished with that business and have turned to the ocean where pirates think that they can get more money immediately and easily. Somali people believe that until this problem of insecurity on the ground is resolved, pirates are unlikely stop.

Q: What has been changing with the new elected government?

A: The current new government has been concentrating on reconciling people following different religious leaders, intellectuals and clan elders, and it has been focusing on restoring peace through dialogue. At the moment, Mogadishu seems to be improving in terms of security.

* Nicola Filizola is Media Consultant at UNICRI.

1 Targeting truth tellers; journalist in a climate of fear and intimidation – Documentation of press freedom violations in Somalia during 2007, NUSOJ, 2007; Somalia: a precarious and perilous place for the press – Annual report



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Violence against women is tacitly accepted in many societies - hidden behind doors and by walls of silence. Yet it is one of the most pervasive and systematic human rights violations in the world today: One woman in three will be raped, beaten, coerced into sex or otherwise abused in her lifetime.



Intelligence in the fight against piracy

* Hans Tino Hansen, Karsten von Hoesslin

With one of Africa's longest coastlines stretching for 3300 kilometres, Somalia enjoys a strategic location in the Horn of Africa. Vital world trade flows around this failed state, torn from within by belligerent clans, warlords and Islamist jihadists. Despite this strategic location, Somalia is a fast changing entity whose unfolding events upset the international community.

Getting reliable intelligence is difficult, but it is a crucial component to understanding Somalia's security issues.

Following developments in Somalia is not an easy task. The internationally recognized Transitional Federal Government (TFG) has control of certain central areas and, as the Ethiopian forces started withdrawing in late 2008, the opposition fought to fill the vacuum, turning the country into a patchwork of conflicting interests. To date, it appears that while piracy syndicates freely roam the central

east coast of Somalia, the Al Shabaab group has gained important footholds, but are being challenged by a reinvigorated TFG in a newly formed coalition with parts of the former Islamic Courts in the southern areas of Somalia. At the same time the de facto state of Somaliland enjoys relative peace and stability, while the semi-autonomous Puntland lingers in between.

This centrifugal chaos underscores the need for effective intelligence gathering within Somalia for those who are affected or would want to interact with the country from the outside. It is commonly said that truth is the first victim in war, but after almost 20 years of civil strife, this is a reality in the country. Consequently, the bulk of open source intelligence (OSINT) coming out of Somalia is compromised by misinformation and biased views pending on clan affiliation; therefore, the need to access the grey area intelligence as well as human intelligence (HUMINT) becomes all the more vital.

Piracy in Somalia

Maritime security in waters surrounding Somalia is fully correlated with the internal situation. With *Risk Intelligence's* focus being primarily on maritime security, our experts have been examining Somalia's security issues for a number of years and has closely followed the major developments both on dry land and at sea. Besides the economic decline and the political chaos, the lack of effective control over the coast is the primary reason for the surge in piracy. From the days of the illegal fishing campaigns (2000-2004), to the attack on the Sea Bourne Spirit (2005), to the formation of the Union of Islamic Courts and failure of the Transitional Federal Government (2006-2007), to today's piracy crisis, the developments have been connected to dynamics inside the country.

In general, there is no such thing as stability and peace in Somalia. Today


Despite the initial violent approach, the pirates are well aware that the crew in general is their main asset, compared to vessel and cargo, and must be well cared for in order to be ransomed accordingly

on the heels of a withdrawing Ethiopian army, the TFG was at first severely weakened and exposed to the insurgency, but new alliances has improved its position again. Lasting coalitions in Somalia are difficult to establish given that the country is split consistently on clan lines. In addition to a severe history of corruption, Somalia also faces a radical Islamic insurgency that controls much of the south.

Piracy syndicates in Somalia operate purely for financial gain by conducting hijackings and, thereafter, engaging in ransom processes. Although some of the syndicates also undertake other illegal activities such as smuggling, the bulk of the syndicates are purely focused on piracy as a tactic. In fact, piracy proved to be so successful that it has become one of the main revenue sources in the Northern autonomous area Puntland and its communities on the coast and inshore are profiting from the business it generates. The primary industry has traditionally been exporting goats, which is still believed to be ahead of the income created by the highly lucrative hijackings.

Piracy tactics

Somali hijackings have become a truly unique criminal tactic. In late 2008 Risk Intelligence produced the comprehensive Somalia Hijacking Report, a complete analysis of the different stages of a hijacking, using specific case studies and first hand interviews with shipowners and other stakeholders. The report sheds light on this specific modus operandi. When boarding vessels, pirates prefer to overwhelm and intimidate the crew. During the attack phase, they tend to be violent and aggressive in order to suppress the crew



and exhibit dominance over the hostages – yet the actual number of injuries and casualties has been rather low. As time passes, however, the relationship sometimes becomes more amicable and the crew is treated relatively well. At times the pirates have even played monopoly with their hostages, as during the Danica White hijacking. Despite the initial violent approach, the pirates are well aware that the crew in general is their main asset, compared to vessel and cargo, and must be well cared for in order to be ransomed accordingly.

The costs of piracy are quite high. The total direct cost of a hijacking can range from USD \$4-7 million including the costs of negotiations, media experts, insurance, legal counsel, consultants and more. On top of this, there are also indirect specific costs to be added, such as the loss of revenue during captivity, crew retention and replacements, and potential loss of reputation. The costs, however, are not only incurred should a vessel be hijacked, but the overall risks have led to increased security measures, insurance premiums, and possible convoys, which have resulted in a significant increase in security-related overhead costs for shipowners. Overall, costs involving the transit of the Gulf of Aden have risen dramatically and the actual financial loss of a hijacked vessel can be quite grievous for a ship owners.

OSINT

With respect to Somalia, little emphasis can be put on Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) given that local newsprint is either heavily censored or biased. When pertaining to piracy, news reports are often repetitive or rumours, and some frequently quoted organisations have a history of inaccurate information, subject to the broken telephone syndrome. As this happens, information becomes increasingly inaccurate as it moves up the OSINT channels. This is exacerbated by the fact that there are so few “expert” sources for public comment and the media is eager to publish any information without proper verification.

Professor Fred Halliday has defined the term “Corkscrew journalism” related to that form of self-referring journalism in which unsubstantiated claims are repeated without local sources, to the point that, in the end, these claims turn into truths. Recent examples are the reports that indicates a connection be-

When pertaining to piracy, news reports are often repetitive or rumours, and some frequently quoted organisations have a history of inaccurate information

His greatest challenge will be providing those engaged in piracy with an alternate source of income and developing the economy to create long-term stability

tween the radical Al Shabaab group and piracy. These claim were based on unsupported news article based on loose statements from Kenyan sources.

IMINT

The use of satellite imagery (IMINT) has become increasingly helpful with respect to maritime security issues around the Horn of Africa. Satellite imagery can pinpoint and identify hijacked vessels off the coast. In addition, the use of other forms of imagery such as photographs has become increasingly important in the past four years. For example prior to 2005, there was little photographic evidence of Somali piracy incidents and even less of the syndicates themselves. Analyzing photographs deriving both from OSINT and confidential sources can have a twofold purpose of both providing and verifying small details that contribute to the overall assessment. Types of weapons, crew numbers, characteristics of the attack boats, and even familiar faces can be extracted from photographs.

HUMINT

Some believe that the Somali Diaspora can be a credible source of intelligence with respect to piracy and other security issues in Somalia. After all, it has been confirmed that piracy syndicates are cooperating with Somalis abroad. For example, when the Danish crew of the Danica White was hijacked in June 2007, it was believed that members within the Somali Diasporas had leaked information back to Somalia on the reaction of the local population and on the level of media coverage. However, Risk Intelligence is very cautious with respect to using Somali immigrants as intelligence sources since migrant circuits tend to suffer from the same inaccuracies as the media or are biased due to clan-relationships. Incoming intelligence should therefore be screened, retaining cleared sources such as existing HUMINT sources on the ground in Somalia rather than exogenous ones.

The outlook for Somalia

Despite the morbid state of affairs currently enmeshing Somalia, the election of the new Presidents in Puntland and in Somalia may help develop the necessary stability on land. President Farole of Puntland has expressed his desire to combat piracy and, since his election victory, he has overseen two success-

On the other side of Africa

To understand the unique aspects of Somali hijackings, it is useful to compare them to another piracy hot spot: Nigeria. This country is facing an insurgency in its oil-rich Niger Delta, involving both financially and politically motivated attacks. Criminal organisations conduct opportunistic kidnap-ransoms and armed robberies, but insurgency groups such as the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) have political aims as well. They kidnap staff related to the the oil industry and release them without ransom and they attack vessels involved in the oil trade up to eighty nautical miles offshore. Criminal and political ambitions are often inter-related and mix with oil smuggling as a revenue source. The culture of corruption and poverty are the only two major similarities between Nigeria and Somalia. The tactics employed and, more specifically, the organizations behind the activities are very different. But in both cases, to avoid such costly ordeals, intelligence and good risk mitigation are key elements to success.

ful indigenous counter-piracy operations, in which Puntland had claimed to have arrested more than 60 pirates. His greatest challenge will be providing those engaged in piracy with an alternate source of income and developing the economy to create long-term stability. Within Somali-proper, the election of President Sharif Ahmed, leader of the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS-Djibouti wing), there may be hopes of negotiating with the radical Al Shabaab militia. The coalition between the ARS-D and the TFG will be tested within the upcoming months, as Sharif Ahmed must first secure a ceasefire between Al Shabaab and the administrative government.

At sea, efforts to contain piracy are well underway. They are, however, only suppressing the problem and not solving it. International coalition efforts first began with Coalition Task Force 150's counter terrorism patrols doubling as an anti-piracy operation plus some ad hoc national operations. A new task force has been formed (Task Force 151), to patrol the Gulf of Aden and provid-



MaRisk map Horn of Africa 2008 © Risk Intelligence 2009

The private sector is also considerably involved. Numerous private security and consulting companies are engaged in improving security with both armed and non-lethal guarding, while private intelligence companies are also cooperating with coalition efforts

ing escorts for merchant shipping. In addition the EU operation ATALANTA is providing security in the Gulf of Aden and escorting World Food Programme vessels, while NATO has had one of its standing naval groups in the area in late 2008 and will deploy the SNMG1 again during 2009. The naval coalition has deterred pirate attacks par-

ticularly with their rapid aerial support in response to distress calls. In March 2009, there were only four confirmed hijacking while Risk Intelligence's maritime security risk monitoring system, MaRisk has recorded 23 failed attacks, and 9 suspicious activities, and anti-piracy operations.


Despite these encouraging numbers, the Gulf of Aden is a very large body of water and patrols do not cover the Indian Ocean where the super tanker Sirius Star was attacked 430 miles from the mainland. Furthermore, the weather conditions have affected the effectiveness of the pirates. Coalition efforts are important but they should only be viewed as a temporary solution while the internal situation in Somalia improves.

The private sector is also considerably involved. Numerous private security and consulting companies are engaged in improving security with both armed

and non-lethal guarding, while private intelligence companies are also cooperating with coalition efforts.

Somalia is a unique example given its status as a failed state and therefore requires a different approach for intelligence gathering. Bearing in mind the special conditions of this environment and an established practice, the private sector can be a key player when trying to deal with the increasing defiance of piracy.

* **Hans Tino Hansen** Managing Director & CEO and **Karsten von Hoesslin**, Senior Analyst, Risk Intelligence.



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For more information and contact: Unosat@unitar.org or www.unitar.org/research



Restorative justice

Restoring Victims and Communities

* Lisa Rea, Theo Gavrielides

What do the following news stories have in common? The Bernard Madoff Ponzi scheme responsible for the biggest corporate securities fraud in history, the Austrian rape and murder case of Josef Fritzl whose daughter was enslaved for 24 years, and the Irish Republican Army shooting two British soldiers and injuring four others in March 2009, breaking the peace outside Belfast? The answer is that we will probably never know what steps have been taken to provide a form of reparation to the victims or their families, in ways that allow them to live their lives in peace. Victims-driven restorative justice is happening all around the globe. It is challenging the traditional criminal justice system by providing a new vision for systemic justice reform. The crime victims and those who recognize their unmet needs are the ones who are increasingly leading the effort to make this transition. However, despite thorough evidence and numerous restorative justice evaluations, the victims' appeals for restoration are rarely heard.

There is mounting pressure on governments worldwide to respond to crime by doing more than just incarcerating offenders for long periods of time. This is partly due to the ever

Victims are saying that they are unsatisfied with the traditional criminal justice system and they are asking for restorative justice

increasing cost of retributive approaches to crime, but in recent years crime victims have also been adding their voices to advocate new ways of responding to crime that directly involve them and their families. According to a number of international studies, victims are saying that they are unsatisfied with the traditional criminal justice system and they are asking for restorative justice¹.

Victims-driven restorative justice is built on the premise that an offender needs to see the direct impact that his crime had on his victim and on the community, and should be given the opportunity to make amends and seek to provide a form of reparation to those he injured. Through the voluntary participation of both the victim and the offender engaged in an honest and constructive dialogue (i.e. mediation, family group conferencing, circles, etc.) facilitated by trained professionals, the participants benefit from the information exchange. Advocates of restorative justice argue that it isn't enough to just "process" offenders in ways that emphasize only the fact that their crime is a crime against the state. Instead, victims



Victims-driven restorative justice is built on the premise that an offender needs to see the direct impact that his crime had on his victim and on the community

are seeking ways to heal while arguing that direct offender accountability will increase the chance that offenders will change their conduct after being released from prison or jail. With the participation of victims in such projects, the victims' satisfaction with the criminal justice system increases.

Some of these justice projects deserving a close examination include the following: 1) the Sycamore Tree Project, a project of Prison Fellowship International (PFI), an intensive in-prison victim-offender program using surrogates tested in 23 countries since its first pilot programme in Texas in 1998; 2) London Against Gun and Knife Crime, a community-based project of Race on the Agenda (ROTA), a programme to reduce violent juvenile crime by addressing issues related to crime and the injuring of victims; 3) Bridges to Life (BTL) based in Texas, an in-prison victim-offender restorative justice project replicated throughout the state of Texas created by a victim of violent crime, an outgrowth of the Sycamore Tree Project, and 4) the Gacaca court in Rwanda, an indigenous community-based justice effort in response to the 1994 genocide involving huge numbers of victims and their families urging offender accountability to fulfil their need for healing and sometimes for reconciliation too.

These examples are just a few of the cutting edge projects in operation worldwide using restorative justice as the basis for justice reform and underscoring the need to involve crime victims. Along with a number of other projects, they have been the centre of government, academic and other independent evaluation and research², and have generated some of the richest and most thorough data ever produced within the criminal justice field. However, restorative justice still has to be mainstreamed.

For instance, following the Ninth United Nations Congress, the formation of the "Working Party on Restorative Justice" brought together a panel of international experts under the

auspices of the Alliance of Non-governmental Organizations on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice. This Alliance collected the evidence that gave a high profile to restorative justice, earning it a place on the agenda of the Tenth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders held in 2000. Their findings, along with submissions from several governments, have led to the drafting of Resolution 1999/26 outlining the basic principles on the use of restorative justice and asking member states to introduce them into their criminal justice systems. This is now formally known as Resolution E/CN.15/2002/L.2 "Basic Principles on the use of Restorative Justice programmes in criminal matters".

The United Nation Resolution is only one of many international documents that call for the use of restorative justice; yet many national governments are refusing to mainstream its practices. As evidence continues to

Victims are seeking ways to heal while arguing that direct offender accountability will increase the chance that offenders will change their conduct after being released from prison or jail

be collected, additional work must be carried out at the legislative and public policy level, while increasing awareness of victims-driven restorative justice among the public, decision makers and donors. But it is clear that a powerful new constituency of support is emerging globally: victims of crime.

* **Lisa Rea** has been a public policy consultant specializing in restorative justice since 1992; Founder, The Justice & Reconciliation Project (JRP) based in California, U.S.

Dr. Theo Gavrielides is the Chief Executive Officer, Race on the Agenda (ROTA) and is the Founder and Director of the Independent Academic Research Studies (IARS) based in London, UK

Victims' panel.
Restorative
Justice
Conference,
FPU October
2006

Graeme STP
training circle

FPU conference
with JRP victims'
panel, Ron
Claassen and
Lisa Rea
(third from left)

Theo Gavrielidis
at meeting

1 Gavrielides 2007, Sherman 2007, Strang 2000, Van Ness 1986
2 Sherman 2007, Sherman 1998, Umbreit 1998, Rea 1998, Strang 1997



GIS & Satellite Applications for Piracy-Monitoring

* Josh Lyons

Without a central government, for nearly two decades the people of Somalia have had to cope with natural disasters, civil war and humanitarian crisis as best as they can, often resorting to informal and illegal economic activities for survival. Although the origins of Somali maritime piracy remain obscured, it is likely that this was a response of Somali fishermen to the illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing within their territorial waters by foreign companies who sought to capitalize on the lack of a national coast guard in the 1990s.

In contrast to these origins, it is clear today that Somali piracy has rapidly transformed itself into a multimillion-dollar business, employing up to thousands of people and generating revenue far greater than the operating budgets of the local Somali administrations responsible for combating piracy.

The rise in pirate attacks in 2008 was significant enough to force several major shipping companies to re-route their fleet away from the Gulf of Aden, circumnavigating instead around the African continent. Against the backdrop of a growing international economic crisis, the threat to international commerce has been enough to mobilize nearly 20 countries to de-

ploy warships to the region in an unprecedented naval effort to protect their merchant fleets from pirate attacks.

This expansion in anti-piracy efforts has been matched by a corresponding rise in demand for information technologies to better manage field-sourced intelligence, as well as to provide additional information and analysis on a range of security issues connected to piracy, including: monitoring anchorage sites of hijacked vessels, identifying suspicious vessel patterns, defining attack hot spots and changes in pirate strategy.

Because of the combination of vast areas and limited access, international aid organizations often rely on satellite imagery and Geographic Information Systems (GIS) to better understand the situation on the ground in Somalia. This technology has been most commonly applied to mapping natural disasters (especially floods), measuring the movements of Internally Displaced People (IDPs) and populations to assess needs and plan aid distribution, to monitor political events and security threats. Following several high-profile pirate attacks on UN-chartered vessels transporting food aid in 2005 and 2006, such technology has been increasingly applied

The rise in pirate attacks in 2008 was significant enough to force several major shipping companies to re-route their fleet away from the Gulf of Aden, circumnavigating instead around the African continent

offshore to address the growing threat of piracy, providing valuable insights on the scale, evolution and dynamics of the problem, and proving highly useful as part of an integrated strategy to combat maritime piracy.

Piracy Analysis & Monitoring: GIS Applications

The spatial analysis of piracy begins with attack incident reports transmitted by vessel operators to maritime authorities (such as the ICC-IMB Piracy Reporting Center), often while an attack is still in progress. This critical data on the time and approximate location of attacks, once integrated into a geographic database system, allows for spatial analysis to identify areas of highest pirate activity and changes in attack locations over time, which can then be compared with satellite data on vessel traffic collected remotely from space.

In 2008, the high number of attacks was unprecedented in the region for two reasons:

- first, the absolute number of attacks represented an increase of 520% from the average of the previous three years (2005-07);
- secondly, the pirates fundamentally shifted their operational focus away from the Indian Ocean to the Gulf of Aden, catching both merchant fleets and naval forces by surprise. In 2008, 86% of the attacks occurred in the Gulf, in sharp contrast to the 2005-07 average of 17%.

Although the causes of this geographic shift in pirate activity are uncertain, recently collected radar satellite data indicate a sharp drop in merchant vessel traffic along the coast of Somalia in the Indian Ocean may have been a contributing factor, thus depriving pirates of a sufficient number of targets for hijacking. Responding to this drop in vessel traffic, pirate militias refocused their attention to the merchant traffic within the Gulf, which cannot be significantly redirected, except to avoid the Suez Canal entirely.

Vessels hijacked in the Gulf of Aden are taken by Somali pirates along an established route south to the traditional anchorage sites of Eyl, Bargaal, Garaad, & Hobyo along the Indian Ocean. Although this pirate route is well known, after the elevated threat and the dramatic geographic shift in pirate activity became apparent in the summer of 2008, there was a corresponding need for new information on areas most at risk of attacks within the Gulf. The map in **Figure 1** illustrates a 3D approach to identifying specific clusters of pirate attacks in the Gulf, where areas of highest reported activity are indicated by the elevated red peaks.

Spatial analysis of the reported attack locations within the Gulf indicated that, during the first seven months of 2008, pirate attacks were generally clustered




Figure 1 - Source: UNOSAT

southeast of the Yemeni port of Al Mukalla. Further analysis revealed that pirate strategy had quickly changed in response to the implementation of a Maritime Security Patrol Area (MSPA) by a coalition of naval forces in August 2008.

Originally intended to protect merchant vessels from pirate attacks by concentrating traffic through a patrolled corridor, preliminary analyses indicated

that the MSPA had not significantly lowered the number of hijackings, but simply shifted their occurrence to the north and west. **Figure 2**, illustrates this change in the spatial distribution of reported pirate attacks both before and after the MSPA. In this regard, GIS-based analysis provided valuable insights on the relative effectiveness of early anti-piracy measures in the Gulf and the dynamic changes in pirate strategy in response.




Figure 2 - Source: UNOSAT

Satellite Imagery Applications

A common piracy application of very high-resolution optical satellite imagery over Somalia has been to graphically illustrate hijacked vessels under pirate control. Imagery recorded in November 2008, for example, near the coastal town of Eyl (a known pirate land base) revealed the identities of three hijacked vessels, whose painted names on the starboard side were clearly legible in the satellite imagery (see **Figure 3** of the hijacked Turkish tanker MV Yasa Neslinhan). Although visually impressive and media-friendly, this type of satellite data generally has a limited role in piracy monitoring and analysis for two reasons. First, it is totally dependent on cloud-free weather conditions and thus unreliable as a data source during the wet season; second, and most importantly, because of the limited extent covered and relatively high cost, very high resolution optical satellite imagery is best suited over fixed target areas with known significance. In other words, it is best used when the subject and area of interest are reasonably known in advance. It is therefore not suited for exploratory and/or operational monitoring of expansive ocean/



Figure 3 - Source: UNOSAT

coastal areas where pre-existing information is limited or non-existent.

A better approach for piracy monitoring and spatial analysis is to focus on radar-based satellite sensors and on well-documented applications for maritime security and vessel monitoring. Radar satellite data has been used for over 15 years, most commonly as a navigational aid to chart safe vessel passages through ice-filled Polar waters, to monitor illegal fishing activity in territorial waters, as well as to detect and measure oil spills. Because of the larger area of coverage, lower costs and weather independence, radar satellite sensors are highly suited for several important applications in piracy monitoring and analysis.

As part of an ongoing need to monitor merchant vessel compliance with established maritime transit guidelines through the Gulf of Aden (e.g. MSPA), radar data can provide accurate and semi-automatic detection of thousands of vessels as they pass through the area. By comparing their locations with the established transit coordinates, it is possible to measure the percentage of vessel compliance over time, and to identify specific areas of lower compliance, which may indicate a higher risk of attack.

Vessels detected far outside the MSPA, in suspicious cluster formations, or falling within recommended vessel exclusion zones along the Somali coast can be readily flagged for further investigation. In one such instance (see **Figure 4**), a highly suspicious cluster of 8 vessels was detected 50km south of the MSPA in radar data recorded on 5 December 2008. Although unconfirmed, this

cluster pattern was possibly connected to an attack reported the previous day involving upwards of 20 separate pirate boats which attacked in a coordinated swarm-like pattern.




Figure 4 - Source: UNOSAT

From a monitoring perspective, regular acquisition of radar data along the Somali coast is especially useful for monitoring hijacked vessel movement near known pirate anchorage sites. Specifically, radar data allows for updated count estimates of the number of suspected hijacked vessels in a given area, identification of potentially new pirate anchorage sites, monitoring vessel movement within a given harbor, identification of unknown vessel presence (suspected pirate activity), and finally it allows cross-validation and comparison with traditional ground-sourced security reports, sometimes revealing unknown vessel activity in areas of primary concern.

Current Limitations and Future Prospects

While the relative importance and value of satellite-derived data and spatial analysis is apparent, it works best in combination with (and not as a

substitute for) field-sourced information and monitoring. It represents an important part of a comprehensive approach to combating piracy. One specific recommendation to government authorities is to establish ground-receiving stations in the region, enabling local countries to receive and process satellite data in near real-time. This would significantly increase local monitoring and response capacity, to combat not only maritime piracy but also for broader enforcement against illegal fishing and alleged dumping of toxic waste within Somali EEZ waters - what Somalis claim as the "other" or the original piracy in the region.

* **Josh Lyons**, is GIS Analyst at UNITAR Operational Satellite Applications Programme (UNOSAT).

Working with the United Nations Human Rights Programme

A Handbook for Civil Society



United Nations
Human Rights

OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Insurance World

New coverage for new threats

Shipping companies report only a fraction of the actual cases for fear of their ships being impounded for long periods or because they simply do not want to pay the resultant higher insurance premiums.

The last developments off the coast of the Horn of Africa, have triggered a veritable media frenzy. Clearly, piracy is not a new phenomenon. However, the frequency and scale of recent acts of piracy are a real cause for concern, especially those off the coast of Somalia, currently the most perilous waters in the world.

A few years ago pirates attacked ships to get at the petty

cash on board or to make off with the ship's cargo. Today, hijacking is the new trend. Hijacking is actually a lot easier because you don't have to unload the cargo at sea, and it is also much more lucrative. The ransom demands have increased tenfold in recent years. In the case of the Sirius Star, the hijackers are said to have demanded an eight-figure sum.

Endangering lives, the environment and the economy

The current events are causing growing concerns. Even if piracy only accounts for a very small portion of marine insurance business, the potential perils are enormous. When a ship is attacked, the hijackers frequently just lock the crew in the hold and leave them to their fate. If the "rudderless" ship then collides with a tanker, we are talking about losses of enormous proportions.

Lines of business affected

The losses attributable to piracy primarily affect marine hull, marine cargo, and protection & indemnity (P&I) insurance. Losses may also be indemnified under loss-of-hire (LoH) insurance. Today, special kidnap and ransom covers are also offered to ship owners. The coverage concepts on the different insurance markets may be largely the same in principle, but there are significant variations by country and type of policy regarding the definition of insured perils and in the structure of the terms and conditions. The risk of piracy is frequently listed under special war and strike clauses that also include the terrorism risk, i.e. the piracy risk is generally insured in one way or another.

The safe transportation of goods across water is a vital economic factor in these days of increasing globalisation, with 90% of all goods worldwide transported by ship. But it is not just the large trading vessels that are the victims of piracy. Private yachts have also become targets.

Lack of government control allows piracy to carry on unchecked.

Piracy usually occurs in areas without effective government control or where corruption is rife. There are estimated to be over a thousand pirates operating off the Somali coast in

2005, there were only 300. There is a very important reason for the rise in numbers: foreign fishing fleets using state-of-the-art methods have pretty much exhausted the fish stocks upon which the locals rely as their main source of income.

Very high numbers of cases go unreported

Keeping statistical records of piracy is very difficult. Shipping companies report only a fraction of the actual cases for fear of their ships being impounded for long periods or because they simply do not want to pay the resultant higher insurance premiums. Reliable figures on the economic losses involved are therefore very hard to come by. The International Maritime Bureau (IMB) puts losses from piracy in 2007 alone at some € 13billion.

Protection from pirates

There are a variety of measures to recommend in order to protect against acts of piracy. For example, there are special sprays that make the deck so slippery that attackers just cannot keep their footing. Another option are sonic blasters, which emit a deafening sound. This alone can sometimes be enough to send the pirates packing. Some ships also have so-called "panic rooms" where the crew can ensconce themselves in the event of a pirate attack. Preventive measures and effective pursuit of the pirates by governments and authorities will only be possible once a clear legal basis is in place. There is clearly an urgent need for action in this respect. The success in combating piracy in the Malacca Strait is testimony to the effectiveness of close cooperation between the coastal states, their police forces and the armed services.

(Source: www.MunichRe.com)



World Customs Organization

What do we do...

- Encourage a global "e-customs" network, and foster coordinated border management
- Promote harmonized and simplified customs procedures, and develop global customs standards and best practices
- Champion measures and mechanisms to facilitate trade, and ensure synergy between international and regional trade activities
- Strengthen the security of the global trade supply chain, and support effective compliance and enforcement initiatives
- Reinforce customs capacity building programmes, and boost customs modernization projects
- Manage and update the Harmonized System goods nomenclature, and improve understanding of valuation and origin matters
- Enhance customs-to-customs cooperation and mutual assistance, and energize the customs-business trade partnership

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
A Universal Crime

Which law applies when a vessel - owned by a Dutch company, flying Antigua and Barbuda's flag, and manned by four Russians and five Filipinos - is hijacked in the Gulf of Aden?

Historically, piracy has been the first universal crime over which all states have the capacity to arrest and prosecute. Nowadays, pirate attacks can fall into two categories, depending on their place of occurrence: on the high seas beyond the 12 nautical mile limit of coastal State jurisdiction and sovereignty; and within territorial waters, including the waters of archipelagic States such as Indonesia. The international community retains its rights of regulation and enforcement of acts of piracy on the high seas, but the vast majority of global pirate attacks take place within the territorial sea of the adjacent coastal State, and therefore within the responsibility of the relevant coastal State.

Piracy cases are therefore very often complex, as they can concern international law, national penal law and civil law. Moreover, it is a matter of fact that not all States have an equal capacity to ensure maritime security within their waters, as shown by the current Somali situation.





International Law and Piracy

Mare liberum

Exactly 400 years ago, in 1609, the Dutch philosopher Hugo Grotius wrote *The Free Sea (Mare Liberum)* on behalf of the Dutch East India Company. Legislation pertaining to international waters did not then exist. According to Grotius' opinion it was not possible to own the sea. For this reason, the publication formulated the new principle that the sea was international territory and all nations were free to use it for seafaring trade.

A universal enemy

The seventeenth-century English jurist and Member of Parliament, Sir Edward Coke, describes a pirate as *hostis humani generis*, a Latin locution meaning "enemy of all mankind". As pirates recognized no nation and their acts were committed on the high seas, the principle of universal jurisdiction emerged to classify the crime of piracy as a crime against humanity (and not against any particular country), thus punishable by every State.

A common definition

The UN Geneva Convention on the High Seas in 1958 was the first to set forth a definition of piracy. According to this definition, "piracy" consists of illegal acts committed on the high seas for private ends by the crew or passengers of one ship against the crew, passengers, or property onboard another ship. The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, which was signed in 1982, restated the same definition.

Political ends

In 1988 the International Maritime Organization's Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation is signed in Rome. It provides for parties to create criminal offences, establish jurisdiction, and accept into their custody those persons responsible for piracy. It furthermore covers acts occurring in territorial waters and acts motivated for political ends.

UN Resolutions

UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1816 in June 2008 authorised States acting in cooperation with the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) to enter the territorial waters of Somalia to undertake enforcement actions against piracy and armed robbery. Resolution 1846 extended the international community's mandate for further 12 months. In January 2009, UN Resolution 1863, requested the African Union to maintain AMISOM's deployment in Somalia up to July 2009.

What Makes news newsworthy?

© US Navy



INTERVIEW with * Tony White

In order to provide counter piracy support in the Gulf of Aden, and to ensure the delivery of the Humanitarian Aid intended to the territory of Somalia, NATO escorted World Food Program vessels off the coast of Somalia, from October to December 2008. This mission was assigned to the NATO Standing Maritime Group 2 and was acting under the name of Operation Allied Provider. Following the request of the Secretary General of the United Nations on 25 September 2008, the operation took place in support of UNSC resolution 1814, 1816, and 1838.

Besides, Operation Allied Provider was an exceptional opportunity to make the public and experts aware of international operations in the Gulf of Aden. NATO ships boarded TV crews and journalists with the intent of sending a clear message: the international community was acting as a whole to enhance the safety of commercial maritime routes and international navigations in the sea of Somalia.

To this date NATO ships are once again operating in the Horn of Africa and in the Gulf of Aden following the launch of operation Allied Protector, which started 24 March 2009.

We met NATO's press officer, Mr. Tony White, in Turin, during the International Maritime Meeting organised by UNICRI last 28 January, to further discuss the value of such a military mission and about the need to address the international audience with more information.

Q: How was the alliance operating? And what is the forecast for future regional relationships?

A: Escorting is a straightforward military capability, but before an alliance can commit itself, it has to be sure that the requests and the rules of engagement are clear; so when NATO received the request and it was debated among the council, almost all nations agreed that this was a pressing threat. On 9 October 2008 NATO responded positively to the UN's request, and the crucial importance of such a decision was that the mission was aimed at deterring piracy besides escorting the food aid.

There was a previously scheduled out of the area deployment of seven ships that were operating in the north of the Persian Gulf. It was a timely request and did not take long for NATO to respond. Moreover, I think this mission was not only a humanitarian aid-escorting mission, but it was also a huge help in deterring piracy.

The previous mission, the Standing NATO Maritime Group, started its operation on October 15th, and on the 20th those seven ships had split into two groups: three of them went to escort the WFP ships, while the other four continued the sched-

uled port visit in the Persian Gulf. The three ships later became four ships as the Turkish crew actually joined us; the mission ran until December 12th, which was exactly what the UN had asked for, because all they needed was to fill the gap between October and December, knowing that the EU mission was going to start up then. During that time we escorted several WFP ships and the humanitarian aid that successfully escorted and delivered exceeded 30.000 tonnes. I believe that in the future, countries like Yemen and Oman will become very important too. And we are also getting encouraging signs that another regional neighbour like Egypt is getting involved

the media coverage on our mission, in the eye of the public did NATO really get involved? If you do not register what the public can read about, and if the public does not see the mission's images and pictures, the institution does not get the recognition for something it did. Another aspect that I judge very important is that publicising your response and your commitment to support the UN and the WFP in the fight against piracy, sends a message to the perpetrators of this threat and it also sends a message to the region that NATO cares about the East Africa area and cares about the countries of the Gulf of Aden.

tivity of news related to the area and to piracy from the very beginning. My first phone call as a media operation officer was to the WFP public affairs person who was based in Kenya, where the WFP was taking the food supplies (and then up to Mogadishu N.f.E) and I shared my views and ideas with him. After having spoken with him, the media coverage in Africa started improving, especially in Kenya and Somalia, but in order to better give a picture of NATO's operations, images are the best work tool. A huge part of the operation was to get images from the actual ships, to the media, not only in that region, but also all



as well: we have a good relationship with Egypt, because of our Mediterranean dialogue process.

Q: NATO's media office also encouraged the media to cover the operations, carrying on their ships TV crews and photographers. What was the purpose of this, and what the main achievements?

A: There is an old saying in media operations, "if you go somewhere or you do something and the media do not cover you, did you actually go?" This is something that I have followed myself in my career as a public affairs officer and, having benefited from media operation in the past, I knew the importance of engaging the media in our mission in the Gulf of Aden. The public needs to see that there is a visible and recognisable response by an institution such as NATO to a threat such as piracy; so if we had not added

Q: Are you saying that raising more public interest automatically raises more political attention?

A: Clearly, when NATO decided to get involved, we knew that there would be risks not only for the ships themselves, but also political risks. So it is important that we get a message across not only to the Somali people, but we also wanted to tell the ship industry around the world that we will do whatever we can to keep this channel safe, because all our nations depend on this international economy; we also wanted to send a message to the pirates saying that we will not stand to this and we will use our military resources to deter their threat.

Q: Did you notice any positive and measurable reactions from the public after the media operation coverage?

A: It is difficult to monitor the media coverage of our mission in Africa, but I could notice a quick change in the quan-

over the world. And I can tell you that, obviously, we have done a lot of media operation planning; in particular, when the Sirius star was apprehended by the pirates, the international media coverage was unprecedented, and so was the fact that we were able to get our image team on board of the Italian military ship to revive the video footage. The appetite of the international media for this video was extremely high, and our images were used in almost all major media networks, because to tell a story, especially in TV, you need pictures.

* **Tony White** is Press Officer at NATO Media Operations Centre - Afghanistan.



Staffan de Mistura visiting Iraqi election poll

Iraqi Elections

INTERVIEW
with Staffan de Mistura

by * Marina Mazzini

In his last unscheduled visit to Iraq last 6th of February, UN's Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon congratulated Iraqi people for the largely violence-free elections and restated the UN's commitment to the country.

The results achieved by the post-Hussein system are important, but the way to go before Iraq can claim genuine freedom and security is still very long and impervious.

In terms of respect of the human rights, and social justice, the country is ranking low: the most recent UNANMI's report covering the period 1 January – 30 June, 2008 highlights substantial improvements in security conditions, with a marked drop in violent, high-visibility, high-casualty attacks by militias or criminal gangs, but the human rights situation in the country still remains of concern.

Freedom From Fear has interviewed Mr. Staffan de Mistura, SGSR for Iraq and Head of the UNAMI about the future of the country and the challenges facing the Iraqis.

Q: Can you provide an outline of the human rights situation in Iraq?

A: UNAMI's mandate calls for both protection and promotion through monitoring and reporting on human rights violations in the country, and to this end, the Mission issues reports that record and report violations.

The targeted killings of journalists, educators, medical doctors, judges and lawyers has continued, as did criminal abductions for ransom during the first six months of 2008. As Iraqi security institutions slowly and progressively asserted their control of more territory, politicians, security officials, policemen and members of pro-government militias frequently came under attack by armed groups.

During the reporting period, minorities continued to be the victims of some targeted violence, threats, assassination and the destruction of property and cultural sites.

The situation of detainees across the Country remains of concern, including in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region. Some detainees have been deprived of their liberty for months or even years, often under harsh physical conditions, without access to defense counsel, or without being formally charged with a crime or produced before a judge, and allegations of torture and ill-treatment of inmates are of particular concern.

The plight of women across Iraq still requires urgent measures to combat gender-based violence, including so-called honour crimes. Human rights violations that are less visible need to be documented, reported and exposed publicly. With the support of the international community, we are confident the Government of Iraq will continue to address these violations and combat impunity.

During the reporting period Iraq has ratified the International Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and the Council of Representatives has adopted a law establishing the Independent High Commission for Human Rights, for which UNAMI has advocated for several years and which represents, if properly applied, a milestone in the protection and promotion of human rights in Iraq.

Q: What do the recent elections represent for the future of the Country?

A: These elections, that took place in 14 of Iraq's 18 provinces and with more than 14,000 candidates, were crucial in Iraq, for three reasons: first, they are the elections that took place just one month after the Iraqis have re-obtained their own sover-

eignty. Second, in these elections Iraqi people were for the first time able to vote on an open basis, to choose not only a party but also a candidate from that party to represent them. And Sunnis this time have voted, whereas in the past they did not vote in a large number.

Last, these elections were about real power, the people nominated are on the ground, in the various district councils, and will be deciding on electricity, water, budget, jobs.

These elections marked the first demonstration of a free people able to choose their leaders and their own future.

The peaceful provincial elections have been a remarkable occurrence in the political process in the country. The polls have come to signify both a growing political maturity and a general keenness on the part of the Iraqis to partake in a process to shape their country's future in real and tangible terms.

However, the elections were only a first step toward national reconciliation. This is a pressing need for Iraq if Iraqis are to grab the chance in 2009 to experience real advances towards national sovereignty, democratic accountability, political stability, physical security and material prosperity.

Q: Which were the activities of UN-AMI staff in view of the elections?

A: We have been heavily involved, assisting the Independent Electoral Commission in all the aspects - logistic, strategic, organization, and coordination - for the preparation of this election to ensure free and fair elections. More than 60,000 electoral observers have been trained.

We contribute to increase transparency and inclusiveness in the electoral process and to encourage informed debates among citizens in the run-up to and aftermath of the election by contributing to the dissemination of objective, impartial and balanced information throughout the country on campaign issues and political debates.

Q: What still needs to be done?

A: The first challenge are linked to the election: an increase of Iraqis' confidence in their local institutions and in accountable democracy more generally is fundamental.

The second challenge relates to the growing tensions between Arabs and Kurds. These tensions, based on historical, Baathist and more recent injustices in the swath of "disputed territories" to the south of Iraqi Kurdistan, especially the oil-rich province of Kirkuk, have infected almost every aspect of the political scene. They have impeded progress on the vital oil law, revenue-sharing and constitutional review.

Iraq's friends in the international community can encourage the national (and largely Arab) Iraqi and regional (Kurdish) leaderships to ratchet down tensions and explore new solutions for some of the most pressing issues: the oil law, Kirkuk, local security forces and the constitution. There is a growing desire among the various Kirkuki ethnic groups to reach a com-

promise that would be acceptable to the other communities living in Kirkuk.

When I recently visited Kirkuk, this was the message I picked up from almost everyone I met.

The third challenge is the need for a greater willingness to seek national reconciliation at all levels and among all major groups: Sunni-Shiite, Shiite-Shiite, Sunni-Sunni, Arab-Kurd and Kurd-Kurd. As the United Nations works to promote the spirit of dialogue and reconciliation here, our staff has noted that "compromise" in Iraqi Arabic is often mistakenly translated as "tanazul," which has the connotation of "giving up on your principles." Given this mind-set, it's hardly surprising that identifying outcomes acceptable to all can be difficult.

Fortunately, during the past few months, there have been several issues, including the elections law and matters in the disputed areas, where tense political standoffs were ended when an impartial outsider presented a proposal that all sides could agree on as a face-saving win. A growing Iraqi willingness to forego the perfect solution for any one party is a positive sign. We must build on this recognition that compromise is the only way to proceed in a nascent democratic system, especially one with such profound wounds.

Q: You have always worked in conflict environments and in several region of the World. Is there a lesson learnt that you feel can be adopted?

A: Circumstances change from conflict to conflict and country to country. Every posting had its own influence and I had experienced failures and successes. What certainly did have an impact on me in was the period in Somalia during the worst time, 1991, the siege of Sarajevo, the siege of Dubrovnik,

the first period in Kosovo, the airdrops of food aid in Sudan, the hunger in Ethiopia in 1984 - each of them had an impact on my professional and emotional life and at the same time it taught me how we could try to improve in order to make sure that we could get the best out of the UN wherever we were.

My first lesson learnt: we must build bridges between the different communities, create a common ground for dialogue and finding a compromise. That has not to be a zero sum game but a balance for which there is always something to gain even when you have to give something up.

Second lesson learnt: a country cannot truly attain its sovereignty or achieve lasting peace, unless it instills confidence in its own constitution, and delivers on basic needs."



© UN Photo/Rick Bajornas

* Marina Mazzini is Public Information Officer at UNICRI.



The UNICRI Approach

The only possibility the international community has to eradicate the phenomenon of maritime piracy is to “deliver as one”, working jointly to reach the same goal.

From Sea to Land

An all-encompassing approach

* **Giuseppina Maddaluno, Giacomo Mascoli**

Contemporary piracy is a booming criminal activity, not only because of its high profitability with an extremely positive cost-benefit balance for the perpetrators, but also due to the acute vulnerability of the targets, lack of awareness and specific countermeasures along with the highly underreported nature of the crime. Since the beginning of 2008 UNICRI started to develop the idea of a programme taking into account the Institute's competences in crime prevention and knowledge management, and its expertise in the establishment of an effective public / private partnership to counter crime. The programme has been conceived within the framework of the UN convention on the Law of the Sea (1982) and on the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (1988), considering also the United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1816, 1846 and 1851 (2008), which authorize a series of decisive measures to combat the acts of piracy against vessels off the coast of Somalia.

The programme

The programme will be initially implemented and tested in three regions of the world with specific and different characteristic: the Horn of Africa, the Gulf of Guinea and the South China Sea. The present proposal has been fine tuned on the basis of the findings of "Stakeholders Meeting on Maritime Piracy in Somali Coast" held in Turin, Italy, on 28 January 2009. Seventy-five experts attended the meeting, representing 10 UN Member Countries, 9 International and Regional the programme's goal is to play the role of a politically neutral "facilitator" of a truly effective public/private partnership (PPP) able to establish a permanent dialogue between victims and potential victims of piracy and service providers of technologies.

The project on the prevention of maritime piracy is structured in four main integrated components: applied research and knowledge management, intelligence sharing and coordination, training, and the involvement of local communities.

Applied research and knowledge management

Within the context of the applied research and knowledge management three main research objectives have been identified. The first is to increase the knowledge on the main features of contemporary maritime piracy in three current maritime piracy "hotspots": the regions of the Horn of Africa, the Gulf of Guinea and the South China Sea. Subsequently, on the basis of the data collected there will be the identification of regional and global Risk Indicators, along with the cooperation of the International maritime Bureau.

The second research objective is to identify "best practices" in the fight against contemporary maritime piracy based in law enforcement and civil society, as well as possible gaps and needs in terms of operational procedures or training.

Finally the research component will focus on technology, assessing possible technological resources for the prevention and the contrast of maritime piracy.

Two main technological areas currently appear very promising and will be considered in the research phase: on the one hand, in partnership with UNOSAT, the assessment will focus on Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) Satellite Technology. On the other we will consider the wide category of the so-called "Electronic Countermeasures" (ECM) for enhancing "active" and "passive" defence for potential targets of maritime piracy.

Intelligence Sharing and Coordination

There are already numerous coordination mechanisms currently enforced and there are numerous other agencies that are dealing with this issue. However, the programme aims to establish, at the practical and operational level, a strong public/private partnership in this sector. Final purpose is to increase intelligence sharing and coordination among local, regional and international stakeholders to reduce the emerging threat of contemporary maritime piracy.

Turin International Summer School



2nd Edition
Migration – Challenges and Opportunities for Europe
September 2009, Turin (Italy)

In cooperation with



Forum Internazionale ed Europeo di Ricerche sull'Immigrazione
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The project was launched thanks to the presence in Turin of important organisations of the UN System and of the European Union devoted to training, research and technical assistance.

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The establishment of such coordination and intelligence sharing mechanisms - among military, regional law enforcement, civilian authorities and private actors - should be supported by the elaboration of standard protocols and guidelines able to link and coordinate the public (military and Law Enforcement) and the private sector on a national and international level.

Training

In the fight against maritime piracy training is a key factor and must be designed on the basis of real needs. Training should be devoted to increasing the capacity of crews and regional law enforcement to identify risks and adopt security measures to prevent, deter or deal with pirate attacks.

A training manual and specific training curricula for crew security will be designed, which will include specific kidnapping/boarding prevention modules. The training manual and the training curricula will be based on UN conventions, rules and regulations, as well as Security Council Resolutions. As a complement to the manual, an anti maritime piracy toolkit will be delivered to crewmembers.

Involvement of local Communities

Maritime piracy experts agree that Maritime Piracy is a crime phenomenon that “starts on land, not on sea”. Therefore the only possible way for preventing and eradicating piracy in a region is by isolating pirates from their local community, and thus cutting off their logistical support.

Therefore, to properly address maritime piracy, some of the factors that are fuelling this phenomenon in the region should be suppressed. This means, on the one hand, supporting preventive and countering measures against, for example, the illegal fishing and illegal dumping of toxic wastes; on the other, raise the awareness in the international community about the abovementioned crimes. At the same time, a supporting action for the local civilian (village elders) and religious authorities (local mullahs), who traditionally oppose pirates, should be followed by a confidence-building initiative in support of regional and international actors involved in counter-piracy operations, making clear that the involvement of the International Community is aimed primarily at protecting the local community and their rights. This should be enhanced and consolidated by an awareness-raising campaign in order to awaken the local population to the problem of maritime piracy and its associated dangers.

The only possibility the international community has to eradicate the phenomenon of maritime piracy is to “deliver as one”, working jointly to reach the same goal.

* **Giuseppina Maddaluno** is project coordinator for emerging crimes and counter human trafficking; **Giacomo Mascoli**, is project officer for emerging crimes and counter human trafficking.

Legal disputes

Somalia is not party to any of the relevant international treaties and does not have any modern domestic legislation directly applicable to piracy or environmental protection. However, the countries currently providing naval forces to combat piracy at sea off Somalia are parties to one or more of the relevant treaties. In addition, neighboring countries such as Kenya, Djibouti, Yemen and Tanzania are also parties to some or all of these treaties, and these countries have

enacted the legislation necessary to implement one or more of the treaties.

In order to ensure that alleged pirates are brought to justice, it is important, in the short term, to increase the capacities of countries in the region to facilitate effective arrests at sea, the legal transfer of suspects, and investigation and prosecution of the crimes in jurisdictions that have the legislative and operational capacity to deal with them.

*UNODC's legal programme assist with the establishment of a regional system of ship riders as well as provide specific support to the criminal justice systems of neighboring countries such as Kenya, Djibouti, Yemen and Tanzania, in order to establish and strengthen the capacity of their criminal justice systems efficiently to investigate and prosecute piracy and related forms of crime. The programme will target the Kenyan, Djiboutian, Yemeni and Tanzanian criminal justice and law enforcement systems by focusing on four elements:

- **Strengthening of the legal framework**, in particular, reviewing enabling legislation to facilitate maritime interdiction, actions of pursuit and arrest at sea and in territorial waters.
- **Mentoring support** and training, including training on international cooperation mechanisms, to selected countries in order to assist them in receiving and bringing to justice alleged offenders.
- **The conclusion of effective ship rider agreements** between countries currently providing naval forces to combat piracy at sea off Somalia and selected countries in the region.
- **Improving facilities to accommodate arrested offenders**, the programme will ensure that security and human rights considerations are duly taken into account when dealing with suspect offenders, and support the cooperating countries in ensuring that relevant international standards are met.

Source: *United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.

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Countering the Spread of Nuclear Terrorism

"POZOR - STŘEŽENÝ OBJEKT -
VSTUP ZAKÁZÁN"
"ATTENTION - GUARDED OBJECT -
NO ENTRY"

* Anita Nilsson

Terrorism in the modern world has renewed attention to security issues, prompting a profound re-thinking in the international approach to nuclear security. If we look back 10 years, at that time it was recognized that nuclear material had to be protected against theft. States were clearly in agreement on this issue and measures for the protection of nuclear material were adopted. Subsequently, nuclear facilities also became the object of international agreement. These agreements were incorporated into revisions to one of the IAEA's standard reference document for nuclear security, INFCIRC/225, The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities.

After 9/11 and other terrorist attacks around the globe, it became evident that nuclear security concerns should not be limited to nuclear and fissile material. They should also include lower grade nuclear material as well as radioactive substances that could be used to disperse radioactivity in the environment. This new approach dramatically changed the perception of nuclear security. Now the international nuclear community is taking a much broader view of security to include all substances, fissile or radioactive, that have to be managed to ensure their accountability, safety, security and, for fissile materials, their peaceful uses.

International Security Instruments

One of the signs that the international community is paying much more attention to security is the fact that there are new and amended international conventions, such as the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material Convention. In this convention,

which was revised in 2005, State parties agreed on strengthening security measures.

Another convention of similar nature is the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, which entered into force in July 2007. This convention emphasises the need to criminalize acts involving the use of radioactive substances for the purpose of causing threat, destruction or death among people, as well as having negative impacts on the environment and property. It also contains an article whereby all the State parties commit to make every effort to prevent these acts from happening. In its operative articles, the convention also refers to functions of and recommendations for the IAEA.

When you bring these things together it becomes clear that a whole new approach to international nuclear security is emerging. The UN Security Council has also made important contributions to nuclear security. They issued a resolution, UNSCR 1540, which contains obligations for all countries of the UN System to protect nuclear material from theft and put in place effective border control, so that any undeclared, unauthorised or illegal movement of radioactive and nuclear materials could be caught at the borders or other locations.

Holistic Approach to Nuclear Security

Another aspect of the increased international attention on nuclear security relates to the need for a holistic approach to security. As noted earlier, all materials, radioactive and fissile,

UNSCR 1540 contains obligations for all countries of the UN System to protect nuclear material from theft and put in place effective border control

should be subject for security considerations. And they should also be considered in every application – at nuclear facilities, for nuclear energy production, in medical or industrial uses, etc. Wherever these materials are, they should be subject to a management system that ensures security. Furthermore, it is equally necessary to underline that such a security system is not ‘one size fits all’. One has to consider the type of material, its properties and how a graded approach can be implemented for security and physical protection. Otherwise such a system would not be respected and implemented in a truly holistic manner.

A holistic approach also includes the so-called ‘second line of defence’, which means that measures for long-term security at facilities should be complemented with other measures to detect stolen materials. For example, in addition to ensuring that a cargo does not contain undeclared radioactive substances at border crossing points, it is essential to cooperate with law enforcement authorities in case of a suspected package or seizure.

It is also necessary to have response measures in case of a seizure. These measures include knowing what to do with this material, taking proper radiation protection, but also handling the material in a safe and secure manner and bringing it to a place where it is under appropriate control. Combining prevention, detection and response is the essence of the holistic approach.

International Cooperation in Nuclear Security

It is widely recognized that the ultimate responsibility for nuclear safety and security rests with the State. Nevertheless, it is also clear that effective nuclear security requires international cooperation. This is where the IAEA can make a contribution and a difference. The IAEA interacts with its Member States to help them and, if there is an interest, develop an integrated nuclear security support plan, which deals with measures for prevention, detection and response.

Internationally, a common benchmark for the security systems is needed. This is done through the development and publishing of guidance documents. The IAEA produces the Nuclear Security Series as internationally accepted guidelines. It is critical that the international community has shared values for the security systems, and that there are common benchmarks accepted by IAEA Member States and other organizations. The IAEA also provides review or advisory services for its Members States in prevention, detection, and response, when requested. In these services, the IAEA assembles a small group of recognized experts to look at facilities and situations in the country, and evaluate whether these meet international standards and best practices. These experts then make recommendations for improvements or strengthening, if warranted. The experts also point out if they find good practices and what these are. Such review and advisory services are important tools for any country seeking to strengthen nuclear security or to convey the message that they are serious about nuclear security arrangements.

The IAEA has a major programme for human resource development, which includes training activities as well as an educational programme at the graduate level that can be picked up by universities. The IAEA also supports information networking, such as the illicit trafficking database. This database contains

information on radioactive and fissile materials circulating in circumstances where they should not be found, and what to do about it.

Additionally, the IAEA provides assistance in capacity building. For example, the IAEA helps building effective border control measures, or improving the actual physical protection measures of facilities with accounting and control systems.

Looking Towards the Future

The expansion of nuclear energy is an opportunity for conveying the values of nuclear security. It is an opportunity for countries to build nuclear security into their infrastructure system from the very beginning and in a holistic manner. All the conditions of nuclear activities should be considered in a comprehensive manner. There are obligations with relevance to nuclear safety to avoid accidents. There are also obligations to account for the material, keep proper registries, know where all the substance and material quantities are at any time, and have the right security systems in place, including a graded approach to physical protection, adequate access control and particular protection for sensitive equipment and information, etc. These requirements must be conveyed in a comprehensive and synergistic manner. The main challenge is to keep in mind is that this new security paradigm is here to stay. When society benefits from nuclear energy, from the medical applications of radiation therapy or diagnostics or the use of radioactive sources in industrial applications, it needs to recognise that this must be followed by responsible management including safety, security and safeguards considerations. This is a challenge, but it is also an opportunity for ensuring further, more widespread, benefits of nuclear energy and its many applications.

* Anita Nilsson is Head of the IAEA's Office of Nuclear Security.



See you in **Mogadishu**

INTERVIEW

with **Mohamed Aden Sheikh**

by * **Anna Mays, Francesco Candelari, Nicola Filizola**

It was the month of November 1991. Mohamed Aden Sheikh, one of the most versatile Somali men and former representative of the Somali government, was publishing his first book in a Western country. “See you in Mogadishu”, a book-interview with Italian journalist Pietro Petrucci, was the story of the state of Somalia since its independence (1960) told by somebody who served its country as a shepherd, doctor, minister and refugee. Siad Barre, was the dictator who first appointed him as Minister of Health and Minister of Culture and Information in the ‘70s and then jailed him from 1982 to 1988; after Barre’s government fell in January 1991, three different self-declared “presidents” started fighting for the control of the territory and the international community was about to intervene.

After almost 20 years, 15 peace conferences, and after 500 thousands people died because of the civil war, Mohamed Aden Sheikh is still looking forward to seeing you in Mogadishu and to come back to his country. Piracy is just the last issue that has come out from the violent anarchy that has been characterizing Somalia since 1991. But what are the causes of this anarchy and what are the possible solutions? Mohamed Aden, who now lives in Italy and is still a privileged observer of his country, has his lucid answers and warns the skeptics: “We do not have to lose hope: I am still waiting.”

Peace conferences

From 1991 to 2009, 15 peace conferences took place to try to solve the situation in Somalia. Today peace in Somalia has still not been achieved. The main conferences took place in Djibouti in 2002, in Nairobi in 2004 and again in Djibouti in 2008. During these conferences three different presidents were elected: Abdiqasim Salad Hassan was never able to expand his authority beyond the outskirts of Mogadishu; Abdullahi Yusuf was never able to enter Mogadishu; the current president, Sherif Sheikh Ahmed, although elected only at the end of January 2009, is facing several difficulties in being recognized as President in southern Somalia. Over 30 million dollars was spent for these three conferences.

Q: Mr. Sheikh, Somalia is again on the headlines. Reading the news it seems that Somalia is the right place to experiment some of the worst crimes in the world: terrorism before, piracy now. What is happening?

A: The media and the international community seem to be concerned only when a new problem emerges, but those problems are just a consequence of 18 years of civil war and a population that in several areas of the country does not have an adequate level of self-sufficiency. This indeed does not really worry the international community.

However the international community tried to do a lot: the US/UN mission in the ‘90s failed, 15 peace conferences were sponsored by Western countries. What more should they do? The international community acts without a strategy. They

have spent millions of dollars to organize those peace conferences, but they did not act in a coherent manner. I was there during the 2004 peace conference in Nairobi, and I spoke with US envoy's spokesperson. Knowing that most of the money was given to local warlords and was spent in luxurious and useless hotels in Nairobi, I asked him whether they had any form of accountability. He said no. The problem is that it seems that, for some countries, this situation of anarchy is even better than any State. Whenever they want, they can bomb suspect criminals without asking anyone and without being charged by anybody, whereas with a functioning State, they would not have the same freedom to act in a foreign land.

Q: Today you are a fine observer of the situation, but there was a time when you were directly involved in the political process. Why don't we go back to understand the causes of the actual situation?

A: I am a doctor. In the late '60s, 9 years after Somalia's independence and a failed experiment of parliamentary democracy, a group of militaries guided by Siad Barre carried out a coup d'état. The previous government was so corrupt that the population welcomed the newcomers. In fact, Barre and his colonels were unprepared to manage the situation from the political point of view, so they decided to go call a group of 20 or 25 young and brilliant professionals who studied abroad to establish the government. I was a young doctor, graduated in Italy, and was among this group of people.

Q: You have been minister twice under Siad Barre, but you have also been in jail twice. Why?

A: The experiment of the group of young professionals guided by a military power functioned well for a certain period of time. We were able to do several important reforms, we introduced a national health care system, we introduced the written language (before that, Somali was just a spoken language) and we started universal education. The experiment started to fail when the expectations of some of the professionals involved in the process were not met. Barre became increasingly suspicious of the people around him and he started to doubt many of us.

Q: So why did many people finish their career in jail and even died there?

A: After having lost the war against Ethiopia, in 1978, Barre started to be isolated internationally because we had lost the support of the Soviet Union without gaining the US's support (as Barre thought he would). And the divergences between the group of professionals and Barre were becoming deeper. Barre reacted using his military power and put in jail whom-ever he thought could have threatened his power. But this policy was also the beginning of his end.

In 1991 Barre was forced to leave the capital and go to the South, but the situation after Barre seemed even worse.

Barre did not prepare his succession and did not prepare the country for democracy. In 1991 Somalia was free from the Cold War, but it was also abandoned on its own; after 10 years of failed World Bank politics, the welfare state built in the '70s was partially destroyed and several different groups were trying to take over Barre's role.

Q: Were those groups the famous Somali clans?

A: First of all, it is important to understand that Somalia is one of the rare countries in Africa which has one language, one religion, one big clan. Then, the big Somali clan has other 6 clans, which have sub-clans, etc. Traditionally most of these sub-groups were shepherds often fighting to have the better space and water for their cattle. When Barre came into power he was able to unify the country under the flag of one clan, one nation. But when he started to radicalize his government, the subclans organized themselves for his succession. And when Barre fell, even the army split into different groups referring to a particular subclan.

Q: Is this division in clans the main obstacle to peace?

A: I would not say so. The warlords who proclaim themselves sub-clan leaders in most cases are not recognized as such by the members of the subclan. The central issue is not the clan but money, power and various trafficking managed by those warlords.

Q: In your opinion, what should the international community do in order to facilitate the peace process?

A: First of all, it should recognize its mistakes. In 2004 they supported president Abdullahi Yusuf even though he had a charismatic leadership only in the Puntland region and not all over Somalia. He asked Ethiopia for help, even though Ethiopians, according to the Somali, are eyewash. He never tried to start a reconciliation with the other members of the parliament. After 4 years even the most blind among the international community had recognized the mistake, but in the meanwhile this time was wasted and the situation had worsened. The radical Muslim group Shaabab, that is still not loved by most of the Somalis, is ruling in several areas in south Somalia.

Secondly, it would be necessary to create a committee able to design a road map, discuss it with the various actual subclan leaders and then provide them the instruments to implement it.

Third, they should involve the Somali emigrants in other parts of the world because there are a lot of them and because more than half of the Somali income comes from the diaspora all over the world.

* **Anna Mays** is a UNICRI Consultant at the UN Headquarters in New York. **Francesco Candelari** is the UNICRI Liaison Representative to the UN Headquarters in New York.

Current clans and social actors in Somalia

In Somalia, there are six different clans and several sub-clans. The four main clans are Darod, Hawiye, Issaq and Rahanwein. Issaq is mainly located in the self-declared Republic of Somaliland in Northern Somalia. Rahanwein and Hawiye are located in central Somalia, in the East and West respectively. Darod is located in the self-declared Republic of Puntland and in southern Somalia.

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04-07 May 2009

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Securing the Sea Seminar

A cycle of lectures, classes, and conferences on: Risk & Threat Analysis, Intelligence – Security Concept – System Integration – Ship Security – Counter Piracy Methods – Legal Issues – Technologies.

More information: www.maritimetradeshows.com

13-16 May 2009

Shanghai, China

International Ship & Marine Conference (ISMIC)

Gathering 200+ participants from ship owners, operators, managers, brokers, builders and other key players in the market place, ISMC generates a unique platform for you to keep yourself updated with the latest challenges & opportunities facing the world's maritime industry as a whole.

More information: www.ismc-event.com

18-20 May 2009

Abu Dhabi, UAE

Security measures and technical solutions for major events and expanding cities Enhancing Public-Private Partnerships

A group of UN Member States' representatives along with private companies will meet to promote innovation on the use of technology during major events, emphasizing both human factors and resource optimization. The aim of the Symposium is to learn from past experiences and promote effective solutions for the future. There will be a series of inputs on recent major events, security preparations for upcoming major events and protection of vulnerable targets - particularly in the context of rapid growth cities.

More information: www.unicri.it/lab/ipotech

18-19 May 2009

Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia

International Conference on Piracy and Crimes at Sea - Kuala Lumpur

The Government of Malaysia will be organising this Conference whose aim is to share this region's experience in support of the global effort to combat piracy. Against the backdrop of increasing pirate activities in the Gulf of Aden, it is essential that all stakeholders- governments, international organisations and the industry- explore whether lessons can be learned from the collaborative mechanisms of Southeast Asian countries.

More information: www.kln.gov.my/klicc

International Agenda

01-03 June 2009

Detroit, Michigan

5th Annual Western Hemispheric Port Security Conference and Trade Exhibition

SecurePort brings together hundreds of top executives from industry and Government from throughout the Western Hemisphere. A chance for attendees, sponsors and exhibitors to enjoy a unique by-invitation meeting venue which facilitates discourse between bona fide stakeholders, streamlines on-site networking, and provides business development opportunities for the SecurePort community.

More information: <http://maritimetradeshows.com/secureport>

8 June 2009

Hanover, Germany

Congress on Crime Prevention

Themed "Live Solidarity - Secure Diversity" the 14th German Congress on Crime Prevention and 3rd Annual International Forum (AIF) will take place on the 8th and 9th of June 2009 in the capitol of the state of Lower Saxony, Hanover.

More information: www.gcocp.org

10 June 2009

Oslo, Norway

Sasmex Conference 2009

SASMEX Conference 2009 is dedicated to exploring the most pressing safety related issues facing the global maritime community today and in the future.

More information: www.sasmex.com

15-16 June 2009

Sarajevo, Bosnia Herzegovina

Regional Conference: UNICRI and ICTY to present manual on ICTY developed practices

UNICRI, in cooperation with ICTY will convene the Conference on the promotion of the legacy of the international tribunals, where the manual on ICTY good practices will be presented. The meeting, organised thanks to the financial support of the Italian government, will involve contributions from the Prosecutor's Office of the Court of Bosnia Herzegovina as well as wide participation of legal practitioners and representatives from the various Courts in the Balkans, as well as representatives from other International and Hybrid Tribunals.


More information: http://lab.unicri.it/int_tribunals.html

Challenging Ideas

The Book of the Month

Dangerous Waters Modern Piracy and Terror on the High Seas

S. Burnett - Dutton



While sailing alone one night in the shipping lanes across one of the busiest waterways in the world, John Burnett was attacked by pirates. Through sheer ingenuity and a little bit of luck, he survived, and his shocking firsthand experience became the inspiration for *Dangerous Waters*.

Today's breed of pirates are not the colorful cutthroats painted by the history books.

Unlike the romantic images from yesteryear of Captain Kidd and Blackbeard, they can be local seamen looking for a quick score, highly-trained guerillas, rogue military units, or former seafarers recruited by sophisticated crime organizations. Armed with machetes, assault rifles and grenade launchers, they steal out in speedboats and fishing boats in search of supertankers, cargo ships, passenger ferries, cruise ships, and yachts, attacking them at port, on the open seas, in international waters. Off the coasts of Somalia, Nigeria,

in South East Asia, entire ships are hijacked and cargo and crews simply vanish.

Dangerous Waters, considered the definitive work on modern piracy, also reveals the connection between piracy and terrorism post 9/11. It currently serves as a resource for government agencies, the maritime industry, ship owners and insurers, security consultants and the media.

"Burnett manages to weave a detailed expose on the treachery of maritime piracy into a thrilling true story... will keep both novices and professional mariners engaged throughout. This kind of vivid, readable yet informative book is vital."

—US Naval Institute Proceedings

A dauntless investigation into a chilling phenomenon, *Dangerous Waters* is an epic, breathtaking modern tale of the sea. Thus far, it has been translated into seven languages: *Terror auf See*, Germany (2004), *Terror pa Varldshaven*, Sweden (2003), *Terreur op Zee*, Netherlands (2003), and also is available in Spain, Switzerland, Austria, Argentina and Korea.

Contemporary Piracy and Maritime Terrorism The Threat to International Security

Martin N Murphy - Adelphi Papers, 2007



The author investigates on the existence of links in between piracy and maritime terrorism. Piracy may be a marginal problem in itself, but the connections between organised piracy and wider criminal networks and corruption on land make it an element of a phenomenon that can have a weakening effect on states and a destabilising one on the regions in which it is found. In this context, maritime terrorism, though currently only a low-level threat, has the potential to spread and become more effective in the event of political change on land. It is only by addressing the issue of generalised maritime disorder that the problems of piracy and maritime terrorism may be controlled in the long term.

The Maritime Dimension of International Security: Terrorism, Piracy, and Challenges for the United States

Peter Chalk - Rand, 2008




The vast size and highly unregulated nature of the world's waterways have made the maritime environment an increasingly attractive theater for perpetrators of transnational violence. Piracy and sea-borne terrorism have been on the rise since 2000. While the United States has spearheaded several important initiatives to improve maritime security, the author urges policymakers to consider four additional measures to safeguard the world's oceans: helping to further expand the post-9/11 maritime security regime; conducting regular and rigorous threat assessments; assisting with redefining mandates of existing multilateral security and defense arrangements; and encouraging the commercial maritime industry to make greater use of enabling communication and defensive technologies and accept a greater degree of transparency in its corporate structures.

for Challenging Times

Piracy, Maritime Terrorism and Securing the Malacca Straits


Ong-Webb, Graham Gerard - ISAAS / IAS, 2006



The Southeast Asia waters serve nowadays as the dominant region for the occurrence of piracy. The authors of this volume add fresh perspectives to the ongoing debate about piracy, the threat of maritime terrorism, and the challenge of securing the Malacca Straits today. This volume of expert contributions opens with a global and regional outlook on maritime terrorism before proceeding to examine, among other specific issues, the transnational threats to security at sea, piracy in the waters of the Philippines, and the politics of security policies in Southeast Asia.

Contemporary Maritime Piracy in Southeast Asia: History, Causes and Remedies


Adam J Young - ISEAS Publications, 2007



This book explores contemporary maritime piracy in the strategic waterways that link the Pacific and Indian Oceans, demonstrating the utility of using historical context in developing policy approaches that will address the roots of this resurgent phenomenon. Maritime piracy will never be completely eliminated, but with a progressive economic and political agenda aimed at changing the environment from which piracy is emerging, it could once again become the exception rather than the rule.

Somalia at the Crossroads: Challenges and Perspectives in Reconstituting a Failed State


Abdulahi A. Osman, Issaka K. Souare - Adonis & Abbey Publishers, 2007



While much has been reported about the prevailing situation in Somalia, there has been a paucity of research articulating the various perspectives and challenges in the efforts to reconstitute this failed state. Dr Abdulahi A. Osman, who currently teaches comparative politics and African politics at the Department of International Affairs and African Studies Institute, at the University of Georgia, USA, aims to contribute in filling this gap with this volume, which presents various contributions on the issues that lie behind the current situation in Somalia.

Somalia: Diaspora and State Reconstitution in the Horn of Africa


A. Osman Farah, M. Muchie, J. Gundel (Edited by) - Paperback, 2007



The book offers an analysis of the present situation of Somalia. Contributors examine efforts at reconstituting the failed Somali state and the role of civil society groups in the processes. They also analyse how the Somali Diaspora and the country's civil society engage and cooperate to further processes of state-reconstitution in Somalia. The volume also discusses various aspects such as the role of external actors in the ongoing peace process, and the Islamism.

Terror on the High Seas: From Piracy to Strategic Challenge (Terrorism, Counterinsurgency, and Irregular Warfare)

Alexander Yonah, Tyler B. Richardson - Praeger, 2009



The threat of maritime terrorism is real and contemporary history clearly demonstrates that the maritime industry, including the merchant marine and shipbuilding industries as well as the Navy, are vulnerable to terrorist attacks. From the Achille Lauro to the USS Cole to attacks on shipping channels, terrorists have employed a variety of tactics, both successful and unsuccessful. This book aims to provide government, industry, and the academic and policy community with a major resource on potential threats to the maritime environment and the response needed from government and industry to meet the coming challenges.

Punishment and Recidivism - The Italian Case

Giovanni Torrente - UNICRI, 2009



In the Italian judicial system, recidivism of people coming from penal execution is a scarcely known phenomenon. Knowledge of the real nature and size of recidivism appears quite fragmentary, although they are periodically discussed in juridical and political debates. This deficiency is strictly connected with the lack of empirical research concerning the issue.

This work wishes to offer a contribution to the literature on recidivism. It presents results from an empirical research on pardon beneficiaries. The analysis looks at different aspects in recidivist behaviour and questions methodological approaches in criminological studies on recidivism.

Penal Reform and Prison Overcrowding

Various Authors - Edited by V.Luda di Cortemiglia - UNICRI, 2009



Prison overcrowding is one of the most challenging problems faced by criminal justice systems worldwide; a problem that persists in spite of falling crime rates and extensive prison construction programmes. Solutions to the problem could not be found within the administration of prison system alone. It is a problem that has its roots in government policy, courts, police, prosecutor services and prisons. Therefore, solutions have to be found through an integrated approach involving all arms of the criminal justice system. UNICRI is publishing this publication, which details challenges and threats of reducing the prison population providing examples of strategies adopted around the world, including post conflict and transitional societies.

ICTY Manual on Developed Practices - Preserving the Legacy

UNICRI, 2009



This manual contains the most effective and innovative practices developed by the ICTY since its establishment until now in prosecuting and trying war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. The “ICTY Manual on Developed Practices” is a comprehensive overview of the Tribunal’s activity, and it is conceived to be used as a practical tool to promote the Tribunal’s achievements to the legal practitioners dealing with similar issues. Written by experienced personnel from the various branches within the Tribunal, this publication is unique in its field.



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
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